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In this analysis, I estimate the impact of the changing relative size of the adult 
male population, classified by age and education groups, on the earnings of employed 
males living in 502 Brazilian local labor markets during four time periods between 1970 
and 2000. The effects of shifts in the age distribution of the working age population have 
been studied in relation to the effect of the baby-boom generation on the earnings of 
different cohorts in the United States. However, the question has received little attention 
in the context of the countries in Asia and Latin America, which are now experiencing 
substantial shifts in their age-education distributions. Taking advantage of the huge 
variation across Brazilian local labor markets, the models in this research suggest that 
age-education groups are not perfect substitutes, so that own-cohort-education size 
depresses earnings, as expected by the theory. Compositional shifts are influential, 
attesting that this approach represents a fruitful way of studying this central problem in 
economic development, going beyond the effects normally analyzed by formal labor 
market equations. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The substitution of one group of workers for another as their relative supplies 
change has received substantial attention in the literature on labor demand (Hamermesh 
1993, chapter 3). This interest is justified by the importance of the potential effects on 
wage rates and earnings, and their role in such areas on which economic and social policy 
might focus; for example old-age assistance benefits, payroll taxes and overall labor 
productivity. The topic came to the forefront in wealthy countries generally (Bloom et al 
1987), and in the United States in particular in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of 
concerns about the wages of young people after the baby boom of 1946–62 (Freeman 
1979; Welch 1979; Berger 1985; Triest et al 2006). 
While the impact of demographic change on the structure of wages was shown to 
be at least temporarily substantial in the United States; and while it has no doubt mattered 
(probably to a lesser extent) in other rich countries since 1945, wealthy countries may not 
be the best laboratories in which to examine these impacts. In the United States, the share 
of the male population ages 15–24 increased from 13.5 percent in 1960 to 19.5 percent in 
1980. In Brazil, for example, the rise in longevity and the decline in fertility caused a 
similar percentage-point drop over two decades, from 37.0 percent in 1980 to 31.7 
percent in 2000. Changes in the skill structure of the labor force may be even larger and 
more rapid: The largest decadal change in the percentage of American men with at least a 
college education was 6.6 percentage points, between 1970 and 1980. In Brazil between 
1991 and 2000, the percentage of adult men with nine or more years of schooling rose 
from 20.6 to 29.7 percent. These types of changes in the age and educational structure of 
the labor force in developing countries may thus provide a greater scope for identifying 
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the impact of variations in relative supply on earnings than do the demographic shocks 
that have occurred in the past half century in richer economies. 
Despite the importance of the topic for economic development, and the possible 
greater variability of the forcing variables in developing countries that would facilitate 
identification of earnings effects, no studies of developing countries have examined the 
role of these supply shocks in a formal model of labor demand. Careful research on the 
significance of changing education and age endowments on wage inequality has been 
conducted (Gindling and Robbins 2001), and labor demand by firms in Latin America 
has been examined (e.g., Roberts and Skoufias 1997; Saavedra and Torero 2004); but no 
study has considered the impact of demographic change in a complete model of labor 
demand. This study contributes to the literatures on the demographic dividend in 
developing countries, and to the general study of labor demand, by including cohort size 
and also the shifting structure of educational attainment in a standard model. Implicitly, 
the assumption throughout the analysis is that relative supplies of workers classified by 
age-education are exogenous to the firm, and that firms bid for workers based on their 
relative scarcity. Using the example of Brazil, the result is a set of estimates of factor-
price elasticities by age-education group in an economy in which relative supplies of 
workers are changing rapidly. 
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Chapter 2. Demographic dividends and labor demand 
The topic addressed here is related to, but different in its focus from recent studies 
of the “demographic dividend” whereby the changing age structure in developing 
countries resulting from sustained and rapid fertility decline presents a temporary 
“window of opportunity” during which a reduced dependency ratio yields high rates of 
growth in income per capita. This positive impact on growth derives from the mechanical 
link between the size of the working age and total population, increases in labor supply 
due to higher proportions of women becoming employed, higher savings rates, higher 
rates of human capital formation, and, possibly, from the impact of population aging on 
capital accumulation via capital deepening. That the decline in the dependency ratio, 
caused by rapid fertility decline, has substantially influenced economic development in 
East and Southeast Asia has been shown often (e.g., Bloom and Freeman 1986; Bloom et 
al 2003; Williamson 2003; Mason 2005; Mason and Feng 2005). These authors stress the 
transitory nature of the decrease in the dependency ratio, and as well conditional nature 
of the dividend: the drop in the dependency ratio will only result in economic growth in 
the right policy environment. 
While the demographic dividend literature focuses on the ratio of the population 
of working age to the rest of the population, the analysis engaged in this study focuses on 
the changes in age structure within the population of working age that necessarily 
accompany the demographic transition, as well as the concurrent change in levels of 
education that normally accompanies and may even drive the demographic transition. 
Whereas in the dividend literature, the focus is mainly on aggregated outcomes, the 
concern is with the distribution of economic outcomes within the labor force and how 
these may be affected by its changing composition. 
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Evidence from studies of the U.S. baby boom has suggested that increases in 
factor supplies led to the decline in wage rates of the expanding sub-aggregates, 
confirming the role of negative own-quantity elasticities of factor price. Similarly, one 
would expect that an increase in the supply of skilled labor will lead to a relative decline 
in its wage rate. In developed countries, however, this decline has not been observed, 
with the skill premium increasing along with the supply of educated workers (Katz and 
Murphy 1992; Autor et al 1998). The reasons may be skill-biased technical change, the 
role of international trade, or other factors; but the results require expanding the usual 
production-function framework. 
Despite their difficulties in describing aggregate trends over the past three 
decades, studies of labor-labor substitution in rich countries illustrate the power of a 
formal factor-demand framework. These studies also take advantage of the richness of 
combining age (experience) and schooling as basic labor inputs, thus driving variations in 
wage rates. While the technology-constant microeconomic findings are swamped at the 
macro level by trends arising from aggregate shocks, they support the basic tenets of 
production theory. Using data at the micro level from a developing country makes it 
possible to take a formal model and estimate more precisely how changing cohort size 
and skill alter relative wage differentials. 
 
POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The debate about the relationship between population growth and economic 
development has been occurring in the population and reproductive health arena since the 
18th and 19th centuries. The first scientific study about the impact of population size on 
the quality of life was done by Malthus in the classic “An Essay on the Principle of 
Population” (Malthus 1798). The main idea was that rapid population growth would not 
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be followed by an increase in food production, because of fixed resources for agriculture, 
and slow technical progress. The consequence would be the fall of available diet below 
subsistence level, to a point that population growth would be stopped by a high mortality 
rate. 
Coale and Hoover (1958) investigated the influence of population changes on the 
economic development of low-income areas, more specifically India and Mexico. On one 
hand, this study emphasizes that the: 
(...) classic Malthusian argument makes it all too clear that low death rates cannot 
be maintained long in the absence of profound changes either in the economy (...) 
or in the birth rate (...). If economic development does not precede the decline in 
mortality, it must still occur eventually if the decline is to be maintained (Coale 
and Hoover 1958, p.17). 
On the other hand, this research goes beyond the analysis of population growth, 
highlighting that “the three demographic factors identified as basic in an analysis of the 
effects of population growth on economic development are population size, rate of 
population growth, and age-distribution effects.” (Coale and Hoover 1958, p.25) In 
practical terms, the study analyzes the influence of population growth on Indian 
economic development, using projected populations between 1956 and 1986, and 
different hypotheses regarding fertility trends. Coale and Hoover indicate that the 
scenario with higher fertility would not generate a useful working force for Indian 
society, because “a faster growth rate might simply add to the already large pool of 
unemployed and underemployed (...) [and] the necessity for devoting much more time to 
child care would limit the participation of women in the labor force.” (Coale and Hoover 
1958, p.285) 
Kelley (2003) indicates that the analysis of reports written by the United Nations 
in 1953 and 1973, and the National Academy of Science in 1971 and 1986, is a good 
source for understanding the debate of population growth and economic development. 
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The author argues that the debate was mainly characterized by a division into two 
different groups, the “traditionalists” and the “revisionists.” The first group suggested 
that population growth is a threat to society, because of the decrease of both the per 
capita income and the economic growth. These researchers tend to analyze the 
consequences of population growth using a short-term approach, emphasizing the 
negative demographic and socioeconomic outcomes that population growth generates. On 
the other hand, revisionists analyze population growth using a long-term approach. They 
tend to examine the positive and negative impacts of population growth on demographic 
and economic variables. Moreover, they analyze how economic and political feedback 
created by the society and government would influence population growth. Kelley 
indicates that during the 1950s the revisionist approach was more common in the reports 
about population growth. During the 1960s and 1970s, the traditionalist approach began 
to gain significance in those reports, and among the scientific community. However, 
since the 1980s, the analysis of population growth seems to have revisited the revisionist 
approach. The difference between those approaches is not directly related to whether 
population growth is positive or negative. Even revisionists agree that high levels of 
population growth are not desired by developing or developed countries. The main 
differences between the approaches of the traditionalists versus the revisionists involves 
the revisionists emphasis of a long-term analysis, positive and negative outcomes of 
change in age structure, and the importance of policies and practices implemented by 
different populations after this change. 
Bloom et al (2003) also analyzed the relationship between population change and 
economic growth. They emphasized that economists and demographers have different 
interpretations of the subject. Researchers disagree on how economics might be 
influenced by the population growth, which could restrict, promote or even be 
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independent of economic growth. After World War II, researchers that viewed population 
growth as a restriction to economic development were concerned about the limitations of 
food supplies and natural resources. Bloom et al indicate that this idea promoted the 
implementation of family planning programs in developing countries, as a way to control 
high fertility, and rapid population growth, and as a strategy to reduce the pressure on 
natural resources, thus improving economic development. This theory that emphasizes 
the restriction effects of population growth on economic development are based on the 
writings of Thomas Malthus, who is cited above. More than serving as a pressure on the 
fixed resources, population growth was also viewed as the source of a negative impact on 
capital intensity. Rapid population growth would cause reductions in capital per worker 
and lower living standards, because “when population growth is rapid, a large part of 
investment is used to supply the needs of the growing population rather than enabling an 
increase in the level of provision per capita.” (Bloom et al 2003, p.13) 
The pessimist theory lost its strength over the last 30 years, since the world 
population doubled and the per capita income increased by three times. Problems related 
to famines are due to the inequality within developing countries, rather than a shortage of 
food. Negative effects of population growth were not strongly verified because of 
improvements in technology, education, health services, and political participation. 
Because of these new trends, researchers started indicating the positive impacts of 
population growth, such as the tendency for decline of natural resource prices, due to 
technological progress. These researchers were not only focusing on the positive impacts 
of population growth. Their goal was to analyze a wide variety of factors responsible for 
the consequences of population growth. Bloom et al (2003) indicate that population 
growth started to be viewed as a phenomenon that could have either positive or negative 
economic consequences. This new analysis generated a broader discussion of population 
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growth that led to population neutralism as the main line of debate within the 
demographic community. 
The group Kelley (2003) identifies as revisionist theorists is acknowledged by 
Bloom et al (2003) as the neutralists. This third theoretical view bases its conclusions on 
the small, but significant connection found between population growth and economic 
development: 
(...) though countries with rapidly growing populations tend to have more slowly 
growing economies, this negative correlation typically disappears once other 
factors such as country size, openness to trade, educational attainment of the 
population, and the quality of civil and political institutions are taken into 
account. In other words, when controlling for other factors, there is little cross-
country evidence that population growth impedes or promotes economic growth 
(Bloom et al 2003, p.17). 
Kelley (2003) suggests that at the end of the 1980s there was a consensus among 
economists about the revisionist theory concerning the relationship between population 
growth and economic development. Four main areas provide background on revisionist 
theory: (1) global resource exhaustion was not verified, because of responsiveness of 
conservation in the face of scarcity, as well as efficacy of markets and political process of 
distributing resources over time; (2) empirical research did not show a conclusive 
negative impact of population growth on savings, just as the decline of capital trends did 
not have a strong impact on economic growth; (3) population growth did not generate a 
shift in resources from productive physical capital formation to less-productive areas, 
such as education. The expansion of education enrollments was verified in the context of 
increases in public spending, reductions in per student expenditures, and efficiency gains 
in other areas; (4) renewable resource degradation, where property rights are difficult to 
maintain, was necessary in the face of the concern about population growth effects. 
Bloom et al observe that all these theories have been focusing on the influence of 
population size and growth on economic development, but little attention has been given 
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to the impact of the changing age structure, and how this structure changes when the 
population grows. Bloom et al point out the need to analyze changes in age structure and 
how it influences economic growth: 
(...) economists have tended to focus on population growth, ignoring the changing 
age distribution within populations as they grow. Yet these changes are arguably 
as important as population growth. Each age group in a population behaves 
differently, with distinct economic consequences: The young require intensive 
investment in health and education, prime-age adults supply labor and savings, 
and the aged require health care and retirement income. When the relative size of 
each of these groups in a population changes, so does the relative intensity of 
these economic behaviors. This matters significantly to a country’s income 
growth prospects. Policymakers with a broad view of development and the 
complex relation between economic and human development must factor these 
effects of changing age structure into decisions about their countries’ future 
(Bloom et al 2003, p.20). 
In developing countries, mortality and fertility rates started to fall at different 
levels after the 1950s, characterizing the demographic transition in those areas, where the 
people in working-age groups were growing proportionally to the dependent population. 
Because of these factors, those countries have the potential to observe an economic 
development. However, if the appropriate government policies are not applied, 
developing countries might experience unemployment, instability, and suffer tensions in 
the health services, education attainment, and social welfare systems. Developing 
countries with transitional advantages, such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, have to 
implement policies to deal with the aging population, as well as take advantage of the 
remaining years of low dependency ratios (Bloom et al 2003). 
In the third chapter of the report presented by the World Bank (2004), the issue of 
how demographic change will affect the global economy is addressed. The intent is: (1) 
to identify the main demographic trends currently facing the world; (2) to assess how 
these trends may affect the global and regional economies; and (3) to discuss policy 
responses that should be implemented in order to face the challenges posed by 
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demographic change. The report suggests that the fertility rate is declining, the life 
expectancy is improving, the rate of natural population increase is falling, and the elderly 
dependency ratio is increasing. All these trends indicate that global population growth 
will continue to slow, the world’s population will continue to age, and the proportion of 
the labor-force population will fall in advanced countries, but increase in many 
developing countries. Most projected scenarios imply that the increase of the elderly 
population and the decline of the young population will have a significant impact on 
economies, specifically in regards to the public pension systems. The effect of 
demographic change on economics is then addressed by the report: 
(...) specifically, per capita growth rates are likely to decline in advanced 
economies, but rise in those developing countries where the share of the working-
age population is increasing. Saving and investment will be affected in all 
countries, but the countries that are aging faster –– Japan and Europe –– will 
experience a deterioration in their current account positions, which will be offset 
by improvements elsewhere (World Bank 2004, p.154). 
Finally, in the discussion dealing with policy responses, the report indicates that 
in advanced countries the basic aim of these reforms should be to improve labor supply, 
savings, productivity, and government budget positions, as well as to reduce public debt 
as a reaction to the aging population. Some specific reforms could involve raising the 
retirement age and providing pension benefits depending on different levels of life 
expectancy within a designated area. In developing countries, the main priority is to 
establish a policy framework to ensure that the potential benefits from the growing 
working population are maximized, while setting the base for the eventual aging of the 
population. Governments will have to consolidate adequate and fiscally sustainable 




The decrease in the dependency ratio caused by rapid fertility decline has been 
shown to have influenced economic development in the countries of East and Southeast 
Asia (e.g., Bloom et al 2003; Bloom et al 2000; Bloom and Freeman 1986; Mason 2005; 
Mason and Feng 2005; Williamson 2003). The focus of those studies was on the shifting 
age distribution of the populations rather than the rate of population growth. The 
dependency ratio first increased after the mortality decline at the beginning of the 
demographic transition, but then fell after fertility began to decrease precipitously in 
those countries. This process has been called a “demographic dividend” whereby a 
changing age distribution allows for fewer investments in the youngest cohorts, enabling 
resources to be allocated for investments in economic development and family welfare. 
The higher proportion of people in adult age groups is a temporary effect since, after 
some decades, this population will age and the dependency ratio will again increase. 
Because of the temporary nature of the dependency ratio decrease, this process has also 
been called a “window of opportunity” for the implementation of specific policies to 
generate economic growth. 
In the analysis of age structure dynamics and economic growth in Asia, Higgins 
and Williamson (1997) observe that much of the impressive rise in Asian saving rates 
since the 1960s can be explained by the decline in the youth dependency ratio. Wherever 
the youth dependency burden has decreased dramatically, Asian countries have 
abandoned their dependence on foreign capital. Much of the contrast in the level of 
foreign capital dependency in South and East Asia can be explained by the level and 
trends of the youth dependency ratio. 
Researchers deduce that the “window of opportunity” of changing age structure to 
generate economic development will be utilized in different ways by different countries. 
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Some governments will apply polices needed to take advantage of this demographic 
phenomenon, and others will not. Those countries that do not apply coherent policies to 
achieve beneficial economic outcomes from this process, will later experience the 
dilemma of older populations with low socioeconomic status, in a context of high old-
dependency ratio. 
More than providing a higher proportion of working age population, this context 
creates the opportunity to improve the standard of living for children, since families have 
lower fertility, and the resources can be better allocated into the education of infants. At 
this point, women have greater opportunities to enter the job market, which establishes an 
increase in the status of women. Moreover, because of lower fertility, parents are better 
able to improve their savings, which increases the population’s ability to generate 
industrial investments and a better standard of living once reaching older ages. Better 
health outcomes are also created at this point, because more resources can be applied to 
the health of infants and parents, including family planning services. 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) examined how this process occurred in East Asia. 
Cross-national analyses were made to show that one third of the economic growth 
experienced by those countries in the most recent decades was due to the demographic 
dividend. These authors indicate that some policies had to be applied by governments to 
take advantage of this process of changing age structure. According to Bloom and 
Williamson, the education of the younger population has to be prioritized. These policies 
should include the future low-skilled working-age population that would be more likely 
to be unemployed. Therefore, public health services have to be made available to the 
population, addressing both infant care and women’s health. Families with a higher 
income are more likely to be healthy, increasing the pattern of development and 
economic growth. Governments must also implement policies that would generate a 
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diverse variety of jobs, which would allow for more extensive public and private savings 
within the population. 
In a study about China’s demographic changes, Mason and Feng (2005) analyze 
the consequences of new trends in mortality, fertility, population growth rate, age 
structure, migration and urbanization during the last two and a half decades. They also 
investigate whether China’s economy experienced a “demographic dividend”, as well as 
whether economic development is likely to happen due to future demographic factors. 
Finally, they identify several social outcomes of China’s recent demographic changes. 
The discussion about the impact of demographic dividend on past, present and future 
economic trends is the main concept contributed to this specific discussion. Mason and 
Feng imply that China’s first demographic dividend “materialized at the same time that 
China underwent its most radical economic transitions and faced the strongest 
unemployment pressures. The demographic factor thus was a favorable factor in China’s 
economic growth during the last quarter century.” (Mason and Feng 2005, p.31) 
The notion of a “second dividend” is then used to explain the demographic 
process that arises due to fluctuations in age structure, which results in an older 
population, and influences the processes that generate wealth. An initial possibility would 
be a rapid accumulation of capital, as a consequence of the aging population. The capital-
intensity of the economy and the output per worker would rise. This analysis follows a 
standard neo-classical model that asserts the assumption that the saving rate remains 
constant. 
However, Mason and Feng build their argument around the neo-classical model 
that considers saving and wealth to be endogenous. Under this assumption, the second 
possibility is that a rapid increase in the transfer of wealth, rather than capital, would be 
spawned by the aging population. In this case, wealth comes not with the accumulation of 
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additional capital, but with the growth of transfer wealth. Future generations would 
provide old age support either via public pension plans or familial support systems. It is 
important to note that increases in capital influence economic growth, but boosts in 
transfer wealth do not. Lastly, there is a third possibility in which neither transfer nor 
capital is accumulated, generating even worse standards of livings among the older 
population. 
The level of the second demographic dividend depends on the mechanisms to 
reallocate resources from surplus ages to deficit ages. Three different forms are available: 
(1) capital can be accumulated at surplus ages, and later in life the capital can be used at 
deficit ages; (2) current transfers can be made from surplus ages to deficit ages; (3) credit 
markets can be used to shift resources to individuals. Moreover, three different 
institutions are involved in reallocations. Generally, family is the main institution 
transferring resources across age groups. But the market and the state are also sources of 
relocating resources to individuals. Mason and Feng emphasize that: 
(...) demographic transition has led to more rapid growth in output per capita in 
many East Asian countries where the demographic transition has been especially 
rapid. (...) Demographic change offers an opportunity for significantly more rapid 
economic growth, but only if the policy environment is supportive (Mason and 
Feng 2005, p.24). 
 
INFLUENCE OF AGE, EXPERIENCE AND COHORT SIZE ON EARNINGS 
The first demographic dividend is determined by the direct impact of the age 
structure (ratio of working-age population to total population) on per-capita income. Such 
as discussed above, the decline in the dependency ratio had positive impacts on the 
economic development of Asian countries that experienced rapid fertility decline. Since 
this literature is based on the influence of age and education compositions on economic 
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outcomes, it is essential to highlight the contributions made by Mincer (1974) on the 
connections involving schooling, experience, and earnings. 
One of Mincer’s objectives was to estimate the relation between accumulated 
investments in human capital of workers and their earnings. Moreover, the earnings 
function was used to determine how the individual differences of investments in human 
capital can influence inequality in the distribution of labor incomes. Finally, earnings 
functions helped the understanding of whether earnings structure can be comprehended in 
terms of human capital investment behavior. 
Mincer was concerned about the estimation of earnings functions because 
previous studies solely utilized the linear impact of years of schooling on log earnings. 
The observed correlation between education and earnings was not strong in those models, 
because variations in earnings associated with age were not captured: 
Though age can be viewed as an inherent depreciation phenomenon in the human 
capital terminology, the growth of earnings with age can ultimately be interpreted 
in the human capital model as being a consequence of net self-investment 
activities that are continued after the completion of schooling. The theory predicts 
that investments are concentrated at younger ages, but continue at a diminishing 
rate throughout much of the working life; because of increasing marginal costs, 
investments are not made all at once in a short period, but are staggered over time, 
and decline continuously, both because benefits decline as the payoff period 
shortens, and because opportunity costs are likely to rise with experience (Mincer 
1974, p. 129). 
Hence, to expand the schooling model into a more complete earnings function, the 
linear schooling term must be improved by the use of a nonlinear years-of-experience 
term: 
This function can be applied in multiple regression analysis to earnings data of 
individuals who differ in both schooling and age. While age is not the same as 
work experience, the latter can be estimated as actual age minus estimated age at 
completion of schooling, though direct information on experience is preferable. 
Clearly, direct information on experience is necessary for specifying earnings 
functions of individuals whose attachment to the labor force is not continuous 
(Mincer 1974, p. 129). 
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The use of experience is most appropriate on studies of female earnings. Studies 
on male earnings would not be biased if age is used instead of experience, because this 
group is continuously attached to the labor force. The use of both years of schooling and 
experience as independent variables in earnings functions improve the results, with even 
better results when weeks worked during the year is included as an explanatory variable. 
The choice of expressing earnings in dollars or in logs depends on how 
information concerning schooling and experience are expressed: 
If dollar values are used, the investment variables (schooling and experience) 
must also be expressed in dollars. If log earnings are used, then the investment 
variables can be expressed in units of time –– years of schooling and years of 
experience. The time measures of investment are far more readily available than 
the dollar ones. For both reasons then –– interest in relative comparisons and data 
availability –– the logarithmic formulation is preferred (Mincer 1974, p. 130). 
Further studies indicate that not only the independent impact of age and education 
explain earnings, but also cohort size. In other words, the productivity factor (ratio of 
total income to employment) can be affected by a shift in the population’s age structure, 
generating a second demographic dividend. The productivity component can be 
exogenously influenced by shifts in the age and educational structures, according to the 
shape of the labor demand curve for each age and educational labor factor. Studies about 
influences of changes in age structure on earnings usually focus only on the male labor 
force trends, partly because these exogenous changes in age structure (fertility decline) 
and in educational attainment are significantly associated to female labor force 
participation. 
The significance of fertility swings and shifting age distribution on economic 
development was analyzed in studies of the influence of the “baby boom” on labor 
market outcomes in the United States (Easterlin 1978; Freeman 1979; Welch 1979). 
Cohorts born during the “baby boom” entered the American labor market between the 
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end of the 1960s and the middle of the 1970s. The new labor force entrants had more 
schooling than earlier cohorts: (1) the number of persons with 5–8 years of schooling and 
with 1–3 years of high school fell considerably; (2) the number of high school graduates, 
and those with at least some college increased significantly. 
Easterlin (1978) suggests that the increase in the ratio of younger to older adults 
after the 1940s in the United States had pervasive socioeconomic implications. Because 
of this increase, the relative economic position of young adults fell after the 1960s when 
they entered the labor market. The Easterlin hypothesis implies that these changes in birth 
rates and cohort size influence trends in demographic and social behavior. More than 
reducing the economic opportunities of the large cohorts of young adults, this 
phenomenon results in the decline of fertility rates, the postponement of marriage, higher 
divorce rates, higher levels of female labor force participation, increasing homicide, 
suicide and political alienation. As a consequence of a cycle process, the smaller cohorts 
introduced to the labor market in the 1990s will experience higher relative earnings than 
other groups, as well as more traditional family structures. 
Pampel and Peters (1995) review several studies that tested the Easterlin 
hypothesis. They examine literature from diverse academic disciplines that offer evidence 
to support or contradict the different socioeconomic consequences of changing cohort 
size as suggested by Easterlin. Studies on European countries are also analyzed in order 
to provide comparative evidence to the U.S. findings, helping to identify the strengths 
and weaknesses of the theory. Because shifts in gender roles and values may have 
happened across time and may have changed the application of the theory on recent 
experiences in comparison to past decades, Pampel and Peters review studies with 
different temporal scopes. Finally, studies that used different methods are reviewed by 
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the authors, in order to determine whether Easterlin’s theory might have a better use in 
aggregate data or in individual-level studies. The main findings suggest that: 
(...) aggregate data support the hypothesis more than individual-level data, period-
specific or time-series data support the hypothesis more than cohort-specific data, 
experiences from 1945–1980 support the hypothesis more than the years since 
1980, and trends in the United States support the hypothesis more than trends in 
European nations. Given these data qualifications, the predictions of the Easterlin 
effect best fit aggregate, period trends from 1945–1980 in the United States. The 
conceptual broadness of the phenomena potentially explained by the theory 
represents a strength, but the empirical evidence does not extend as far as the 
theory suggests (Pampel and Peters 1995, p.189). 
As elucidated by Macunovich (1998), the extensive literature on fertility aspects 
of the Easterlin hypothesis gives support to the theory, but the relationship has been 
changing across countries and time periods. Macunovich observes that because of data 
limitations and individual interpretations of the hypothesis, many studies with opposite 
findings have been weakly related to the Easterlin hypothesis. Simplified interpretations 
of the hypothesis resulted in a tendency to abandon this theory. These inquiries centered 
the analysis around the relationship between relative cohort size and fertility, instead of 
on the relationship between relative income and fertility. Moreover, these interpretations 
of the Easterlin hypothesis only dealt with the factor of cohort size and did not include 
other elements that could have an effect on income and fertility trends. Summarizing her 
analysis, Macunovich indicates that: 
In aggregate analyses, studies which find little or no support for the Easterlin 
hypothesis tend to be those which: [1] use variables which are not age-specific 
(This is particularly true of the European analyses: none of the aggregate studies 
of countries outside North America have used age-specific relative income 
measures); [2] use relative cohort size or relative income variables without any 
other controls; [3] attempt to fit the Easterlin model with older (age 30+) age 
groups; [4] treat family income and male earnings as interchangeable; [5] use 
relative cohort size rather than relative income as the independent variable 
(especially in later years). In microlevel analysis, studies which find little or no 
support for the Easterlin hypothesis tend to be those which: [1] treat family 
income and male earnings as interchangeable; [2] use only the husband’s 
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characteristics in formulating relative income variables, without information on 
his or his wife’s parents; [3] focus the analysis only on women in intact first 
marriages with no ‘unwanted’ or ‘unintended’ births, and analyze fertility with 
age at marriage held constant; [4] with categorical rather than continuous 
measures of relative income, treat the second generation’s minimum consumption 
threshold (i.e. the level of affluence required before they feel able to support a 
family) as equal to first generation income, rather than a function of it; [5] use 
expected or desired rather than actual fertility (Macunovich 1998, p.98). 
Supportive analyses of the Easterlin hypothesis validate further work in this area. 
Freeman (1979) studied the effect of changes within the age structure of the workforce on 
age-earnings profiles in the United States. Because of the “baby boom” that followed 
World War II and peaked between 1955–1960, there was an especially significant change 
in the age structure of the U.S. workforce in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This 
timeframe was a period when the number of young persons increased very rapidly. The 
key finding was that the age-earnings profile of male workers appears to be significantly 
influenced by the age composition of the workforce. In prior studies, the age-earnings 
profile was usually viewed as a stable economic relationship determined by human 
capital investment decisions, assuming that earnings only rise with age and experience as 
a result of individual investment behavior. Freeman notes that from the late 1960s 
through the mid-1970s, when the number of young workers increased rapidly, the 
earnings of young male workers fell relative to the earnings of older male workers, 
altering male age-earnings profiles, particularly for college graduates. 
Welch (1979) scrutinized the 1968-1976 March Current Population Surveys 
(CPS) in order to assess the impact of the change in age composition experienced by the 
United States. due to the entrance of the post-World War II baby boom cohorts into the 
job market. The main hypothesis was again that the changing age composition of the 
workforce affected earnings patterns. The key finding was that the pressure of a 
workforce whose average age is rapidly declining results in the reduction of the wages of 
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new entrants. Welch points out that there is strong evidence that large cohorts do depress 
earnings, and that these effects increase with level of schooling. Moreover, most of the 
negative effect on earnings comes early in the individual’s career, suggesting that 
negative effects rapidly diminish and reach a smaller permanent level at a relatively 
young age. 
Berger (1985) suggests that the negative effects of cohort size on earnings do not 
diminish rapidly, contrary to what Welch observes. Cohort size also has a negative effect 
on early career earnings growth, which is in opposition to Welch’s findings. The impact 
of cohort size on earnings may actually increase throughout the careers of individuals in 
large cohorts. These trends are explained by Berger, as follows: 
(...) using data almost identical to those employed by Welch, the restrictions 
inherent in his empirical model are rejected in favor of a more general model, 
which involves separate earnings equations for older and younger worker 
subsamples. (...) Cohort size effects on earnings levels appear to widen with 
experience, suggesting a continually increasing cohort size earnings ‘penalty’ as 
workers in large cohorts move through their careers. This suggests that there will 
be no quick recovery of the earnings levels of workers in large entry cohorts as is 
implied by Welch’s study. At the very least, the lower observed rates of earnings 
growth in large cohorts are consistent with slower speeds of transition between 
the learning and fully trained stages of the career (Berger 1985, p.572). 
These cohort-size studies suggested that shifts in factor supply (the baby boom) 
led to a decline in wages, so that demand shifts did not explain all the wage variation. By 
the same token, an increase in the supply of skilled labor should lead to a relative decline 
in the wage of skilled relative to unskilled labor. In the context of a production function 
with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and downward-sloping demand for 
relative skill, an increase in the provision of skilled labor will lead to a decline in the skill 
premium (defined as the wage of skilled workers divided by that of unskilled). In 
developed countries, in contrast, the skill premium increased while the supply of 
educated workers has risen steadily. Katz and Murphy (1992) found that the relative 
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supply of skilled labor combined with smoothly rising demand explains U.S. relative 
wage trends between 1967 and 1987. Autor et al (1998) used a longer time series to test 
the smooth rising demand hypothesis, and found some evidence that accelerating demand 
rationalized the U.S. wage premium shifts. An alternative justification for the rising wage 
premium is the role of trade, the U.S. engagement with countries in which skills are 
relatively scarce. An institutional explanation may also be suggested to the extent that the 
real minimum wage and the bargaining power of unions declined during this period. 
Triest et al (2006) have conducted the most recent analysis of population aging 
and the structure of wages in the United States. Their research explores the effect of labor 
market experience, relative cohort size and real wage growth on real wages by level of 
education using the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1964 and 2004. 
Referring to the Census Bureau, the authors emphasize that the working population in the 
United States will increase by 13 percent between 2001 and 2025, but the population 
between 60 and 64 years of age will increase by 90 percent. This process shows that the 
cohorts of baby boomers are entering retirement ages, increasing the elderly dependency 
ratio, as well as decreasing the growth rate of the working age population. This 
demographic dynamic will have some influence on economics: “as a consequence, labor 
supply may grow at a slower rate than labor demand, putting upward pressure on wages 
and creating tight labor market conditions. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that the 
age distribution of the labor force will also be changing.” (Triest et al 2006, p.1) 
Triest et al’s models indicate that: (1) increases in relative cohort size are 
associated with decreases in wages; (2) although real wages initially increase with labor 
market experience, there is a significant decrease in the rate of growth as experience 
increases; (3) there was a general increase in the economic return to educational 
attainment; (4) changes in the age and experience composition of the labor force will 
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continue to have an important influence on the structure of wages; (5) the initial increase 
in the experience premium generated by the baby boom’s entry into the labor market is 
now being reversed as the baby boom progresses through middle age and approaches 
retirement. More specifically, the authors stress that baby boomers born in 1950 
encompassed a large fraction of the college educated labor force when they entered the 
labor market. At that time, their wages would have been 18 percent higher if their relative 
cohort size was the same as that of the 1970 cohort when entering the labor force. Large 
cohorts depress their own wages relative to those of other cohorts in the labor force at the 
same time. Triest et al imply that changes in the age and experience composition of the 
labor force will continue to have an important influence on the structure of wages. 
While these studies all refer to the U.S. case, they illustrate the power of the 
supply-demand framework and the richness of combining age and schooling as basic 
labor inputs, thus driving wage variations. 
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Chapter 3. Brazilian background and data 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN BRAZIL 
Martine et al (1994) observe that since the 1970s Brazilian society has been 
experiencing a significant reduction in fertility rates. This decline caused a significant 
reduction of the population growth rate, as well as a change in age structure in the 
country. They consider this change to be the most significant structural variation to have 
occurred in Brazil at the end of the 20th century. They estimated that the total fertility 
rate in the country fell from 6.5 in 1940, to 6.3 in 1950, 5.8 in 1970, and 4.3 in 1980. 
Projections for the following decades were also done, generating the following figures for 
the total fertility rate: 2.87 (1990–1995), 2.63 (1995–2000), 2.41 (2000–2005), 2.20 
(2005–2010), 2.19 (2010–2015), and 2.19 (2015–2020). Some other estimates were also 
done by Potter et al (2002), referencing total fertility rates equal to 6.0 in 1960, 6.0 in 
1970, 4.8 in 1980, and 3.2 in 1991. 
By observing this downward trend in fertility, Martine et al suggest that a social 
policy program should be considered for the medium and long term. In other words, they 
indicate the need for Brazilian society to be prepared for the new context of social 
demands that will be generated by aging population. This shift in the demographic pattern 
creates a positive environment to solve social problems inherent in the country. On one 
hand, the youth population is decreasing its proportional participation in the overall 
population. On the other hand, the older population is not growing as fast as the working 
population. Because of this trend, the country can improve its indicators in the attainment 
and quality of education for the youth, as well as in the social security system and health 
care of the older age groups. The implications of these demographic changes on the labor 
market are not extensively debated. However, they suggest that the female participation 
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in the labor market is increasing; the pressure of new cohorts on the market is not 
unbearably strong, because of the decline of people below 15 years of age; the 
improvement in years of schooling delays the search for jobs; and the occupation and 
income patterns are adapting from a rural into a more urban structure. 
Moreira (2001) also emphasizes the important role of fertility decline in the 
transformation of Brazilian age structure. Analyzing the interrelationships between age 
groups, it is noticed that both the child dependency ratio and the aged dependency ratio 
determined the decline of the total dependency ratio. The projection shows that the total 
dependency ratio will reach the minimum values between 2010 and 2020. This period 
which will last until approximately 2025 was characterized as a “window of opportunity” 
by Carvalho and Wong (1999). Suggesting the same perspective as the studies developed 
about East-Asian countries, these authors indicate that the opportunity to improve 
socioeconomic resources to focus on the young population, and the possibility to plan 
policies in order to address the challenges of a growing elderly population are some of 
the beneficial assets that Brazil will face with the new age structure patterns. 
Carvalho and Garcia (2003) analyze the process of aging relating to the Brazilian 
population. They stress that the proportional increase of older age groups is due to the 
fertility decline, rather than a mortality decline. The age distribution was constant until 
the 1960s, and was characterized by a young population, in which 52 percent were 
concentrated below 20 years of age, and less than three percent of the population was 
over 65 years of age. Following this period, mortality had a significant decline, mainly in 
the area of infant mortality. Estimations and projections made by the Brazilian Census 
Bureau indicate the decline of the infant mortality rate per thousand: 162.4 in 1930, 150.0 
in 1940, 135.0 in 1950, 124.0 in 1960, 115.0 in 1970, 82.8 in 1980, 48.3 in 1990 (IBGE 
1999a), 33.74 in 2000, 27.96 in 2010, and 27.11 in 2020 (IBGE 1999b). The life 
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expectancy at birth increased over time: 41.2 in 1940, 43.6 in 1950, 53.7 in 1970, 59.9 in 
1980 (Martine et al 1994), 66.03 in 1991, 68.55 in 2000, 70.08 in 2010, and 70.37 in 
2020 (IBGE 1999b). 
Estimations and projections of the medium variant models from the United 
Nations are also included to show the trends of total fertility rate, infant mortality rate, 
life expectancy at birth, and dependency ratios in Brazil, between 1950 and 2050 (Table 
3.1 and Figure 3.1). 
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Table 3.1. Total Fertility Rate, Infant Mortality Rate and Life Expectancy at Birth in 
Brazil, 1950–2050. 
Period Total Fertility Rate 
Infant Mortality 
Rate (per 1,000 births) 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth (years) 
1950–1955 6.15 134.7 50.9 
1955–1960 6.15 121.9 53.3 
1960–1965 6.15 109.4 55.7 
1965–1970 5.38 100.1 57.6 
1970–1975 4.72 90.5 59.5 
1975–1980 4.31 78.8 61.5 
1980–1985 3.8 63.3 63.1 
1985–1990 3.1 52.4 64.9 
1990–1995 2.6 42.5 66.6 
1995–2000 2.45 34.1 68.8 
2000–2005 2.35 27.4 70.3 
2005–2010 2.25 23.6 71.9 
2010–2015 2.15 20.3 72.9 
2015–2020 2.06 17.1 74.2 
2020–2025 1.98 14.3 75.2 
2025–2030 1.92 12.1 76.2 
2030–2035 1.86 10.3 77 
2035–2040 1.85 9.1 77.8 
2040–2045 1.85 8.1 78.5 
2045–2050 1.85 7.5 79.2 
Source: United Nations –– http://esa.un.org/unpp (in August 16, 2006 –– medium variant). 
 
Figure 3.1. Dependency Ratios in Brazil, 1950–2050. 
 
Source: United Nations –– http://esa.un.org/unpp (in August 16, 2006 –– medium variant). 
 
By analyzing the United Nations data, Alves (2004) determines that the 
demographic transition can benefit the economic development of Brazil. However, this 
demographic bonus will result in economic growth only if the available labor force is 
absorbed by the market through the implementation of appropriate policies. Those 
policies should take into account the better health indicators, education, and habitation in 
order to promote the economic development. After 2030, the demographic conditions 
will not be as favorable for this advancement, which can be observed by the increased 
projections in the dependency ratios. 
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Wong and Carvalho (2005) also investigate the challenges Brazilian society will 
face as a result of the transition in age structure. The authors suggest that the window of 
opportunity experienced in Brazil will not result in the automatic solution of social 
problems. The new population dynamics should be taken into account in order to 
implement social policies. In their analysis, many of the demographic benefits have 
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already been wasted because appropriate policies were not implemented. Labor force 
skills should be improved, in order to promote higher productivity. The working 
population is the group that will be forced to support the rapidly growing older 
population in the future. The elderly will drain resources through the use of the social 
security system and public health care. Wong and Carvalho conclude that the window of 
opportunity has a short duration, and it will go unutilized if reforms in policies for older 
people are not applied, and if funding programs for the younger population are not 
executed. 
Rios-Neto (2005) emphasizes that the Brazilian demographic dynamic, related to 
its changing age structure, offers an opportunity for economic development. Moreover, 
the increase in maternal education might increase the demand for schooling, as well as 
improve the quality of the school system. The education attainment in the country 
increased, because the proportional reduction of the population under 15 years of age is 
decreasing the pressure on the school system. Finally, Rios-Neto concludes that 
numerous other factors, separate from the study of the demographic dividend, need to be 




The shocks that generated subsequent changes in relative labor supply by cohort 
began some decades ago in Brazil, with data suggesting that fertility decline initiated in 
the 1940s in Porto Alegre, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. In the early 1960s, the decline 
in fertility in the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Porto Alegre led to 
total fertility rates below five. From these locations the decline spread to the interior of 
these Southeastern states, and to the capital cities of states in the Central-West, North and 
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Northeast, finally reaching the interior and rural areas of those regions in the 1980s. At 
the municipal level in 2000 there were a substantial number of entities with total fertility 
rates above four, while there were also many where fertility had fallen below 
replacement. The variation in the timing and speed of the fertility transition led to 
substantial differences in the age distribution across states and municipalities, as well as 
across different points in time (Potter et al 2002). 
The longest series of data on age, education and earnings come from the Brazilian 
Censuses conducted in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000. Microdata from these 
Censuses are available from long-form questionnaires administered to 25-percent 
samples in 1960, 1970, and 1980. In 1991 and 2000 the sample sizes depended on the 
size of the municipality, with 10-percent samples from municipalities with more than 
15,000 inhabitants, and 20-percent samples from all other municipalities. In all cases 
there are records for every individual in the sampled households, containing information 
on age, gender, marital status, educational attainment, enrollment in school, and, if 
employed, occupation and earnings. There are also questions on migration, including 
state of birth, previous residence, and residence five years before the Census. 
The lowest level of geographic identifier on these records common to all 
Censuses is the município, since information on distritos, the sub-divisions of municípios, 
is not available in the Census microdata. In a previous work, Potter et al (2002) 
established minimum comparable areas that account for the changing definitions and 
divisions of municípios across the Census years, which is necessary since their number 
increased from approximately 2,300 in 1960 to 5,280 in 2000. The authors were able to 
aggregate minimum comparable areas into 502 micro-regions across the five Censuses. It 
is important to note that these micro-regions differ from those defined by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and those available in the Census microdata, 
 30
but closely approximate those defined for the 1991 Census. It is thus possible to calculate 
various statistics summarizing the age distribution, labor-market outcomes and education 
indicators for each of these 502 consistently defined areas in each of the five Censuses. In 
the end, because the 1960 Census categorized earnings by bracket, this Census is 
excluded and the analyses are based on the Censuses beginning in 1970. 
Since there is a very pronounced trend in the age distribution that has substantial 
variation across regions, states and municipalities, this study seeks to take advantage of 
this change at the micro-region level. Using these very small geographical units poses the 
question of internal migration, which has not been incorporated in most preceding 
analyses conducted at the national level. The migration component could be an important 
factor in this context, since the main population streams have been moving from areas 
with higher fertility to those with lower fertility. While such migration tends to lessen the 
differential in fertility between sending and receiving areas, the greater likelihood that 
migrants will be of working age actually increases the variation in dependency rates. 
Borjas et al (1997) develop a discussion of the role of internal migration on modifying 
the impacts of exogenous changes in relative supply on relative wage rates. This potential 
problem will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
CREATING AGGREGATE-LEVEL DATA 
Census microdata were aggregated in such a way that for each micro-region there 
are 48 observations, since age was categorized into four groups, education into three 
groups, and four different Census years were used (1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000), as it 
will be explained below. A new age-education variable with twelve categories was 
developed. For each micro-region, age-education, and year cells, the mean income was 
calculated, accounting for currency changes and inflation. The distribution of males ages 
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15–64 in each age-education group was also calculated by micro-region in each Census 
year. 
The decision to generate age and education groups in the analysis of earnings was 
based on previous labor market studies. Hamermesh (1993) indicates that it is difficult to 
know whether a particular aggregation of labor is appropriate, therefore studies generally 
aggregate workers that present similar characteristics in the labor market. The 
classification of workers by experience and/or age has been used in previous studies on 
human capital, emphasizing that this is a validated way to classify workers by skill in 
studies on labor demand. Suggesting that researchers have to aggregate workers based on 
intuition, Hamermesh states that: 
(...) this aggregation almost always involves simply summing the number of 
workers, so that the even stronger assumption that the workers are equally 
productive is also implicit. It also implies that the individuals who are aggregated 
are separable from the other inputs. (...) Studies that create their own aggregates 
by examining substitution among very narrowly defined groups of workers, or 
even among individuals, are more believable than those that take published 
aggregates and analyze the demand for them (Hamermesh 1993, pp.65 and 67). 
Welch (1979) found that workers in adjacent experience cells are more likely to 
influence each other’s labor market opportunities (within educational attainment) than 
workers in different experience groups (between educational attainment groups). Taking 
into account Welch’s findings, Borjas (2003) and Triest et al (2006) classified 
information on education attainment in different groups for the estimation of labor 
outcomes models. Borjas (2003) analyses the impact of immigrant share on labor market 
outcomes in the United States by different education groups. He utilized separate models 
for four education groups: high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, persons who 
have some college (between thirteen and fifteen years of schooling), and college 
graduates or more. Using the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1964 to 
2004, Triest et al (2006) calculate the impact of labor market experience and relative 
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cohort size on the level of real wages using five different levels of education: (1) less than 
high school (high school dropouts), (2) high school graduates, (3) individuals with some 
college, (4) college graduates, (5) individuals with post-college education (graduate 
education). 
Borjas (2003) and Triest et al (2006) created variables for labor market 
experience based on information of the age and educational attainment of workers. 
Borjas: 
(...) assume[s] that the age of entry into the labor market is 17 for the typical high 
school dropout, 19 for the typical high school graduate, 21 for the typical person 
with some college, and 23 for the typical college graduate. Let AT be the assumed 
entry age for workers in a particular schooling group. The measure of work 
experience is then given by (Age - AT). I restrict the analysis to persons who have 
between 1 and 40 years of experience (Borjas 2003, p.1341). 
Triest et al (2006) also constructed defined groups of work experience based on 
age and educational attainment: (Age - 17) for high school dropouts; (Age - 18) for high 
school graduates; (Age - 20) for people with some college; (Age - 22) for college 
graduates; and (Age - 24) for people with graduate education. 
In this analysis, the labor force is categorized into four age groups: Youths (15–
24), young adults (25–34), experienced adults (35–49) and older adults (50–64). The 
widths of the age categories are unequal in order to make the fractions in each category 
somewhat more equal. In light of the immense evidence on the role of education in 
defining sub-aggregates of labor (Hamermesh 1993, chapter 3; Borjas 2003), workers are 
cross-classified by their educational attainment based on Riani (2005). 
Riani notes that by 2000 the majority of Brazilians between ages 7 and 14 were in 
school, and large fractions were completing elementary school. Moreover, she observes 
that there was a decrease in regional, racial and rural-urban differentials in elementary 
school attainment. On the other hand, although more people are attending secondary 
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school, the proportion of people with between nine and 12 years of schooling is still 
small, and regional differences are still significant. Riani emphasizes that elementary 
education is spreading to the whole population. However, since completion of high 
school is still low, the differentials tend to increase because people with better 
socioeconomic status are the first ones to obtain more education. Taking into account the 
specifics of the Brazilian population, workers are classified by educational attainment 
into three main groups: Zero to four years, five to eight years, and at least nine years of 
schooling. The first group includes people who completed no further than the first phase 
of elementary school. The second group contains people who completed some or all of 
the second phase of elementary education. The third group is comprised of people with at 
least some secondary education. 
Because of the differences in educational attainment by cohorts, using separate 
vectors of indicators for age and education would overlook the rapid change in 
educational attainment across cohorts, resulting in multicollinearity in the estimated 
factor-price elasticities. To obviate this difficulty, a full set of interactions of the four age 
indicators and the three education categories are generated. For each of the twelve cells, 
for each micro-region and each year, mean earnings and the proportion of males in each 
age-education group are calculated. 
Jannuzzi (2003) summarizes all income variables available in the 1960–2000 
Brazilian Censuses. For workers with fixed incomes, this information refers to gross 
earnings received in the month previous to the Census reference date (or the last worked 
month). For those with varying incomes (self-employed, employers, workers by 
commission, and others), earnings refer to the mean of monthly gains received in the 
previous 12 months before the Census date (or to the mean of monthly gains for the time 
worked, for those who worked less than 12 months), minus usual work costs. From 1960 
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to 1980, the reference month in the Censuses was the one at the time of the interview. In 
1991, the Census reference month was August of that year. For 2000, July was the month 
of reference. 
In the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, the information on earnings refers to the total of 
monthly income from all sources, for people with at least ten years of age. Earnings 
include only regular income, excluding gains from real estate, retirement pension, and 
insurance, for instance. However, Jannuzzi emphasizes that retirement pensions had a 
small value at that time, and the proportion of the population receiving retirement 
pensions was insignificant. Moreover, the inequality was extemely accentuated in the 
1960s and 1970s, thus the number of people receiving income from real estate, interest 
rates or other sources was irrelevant. Therefore, the information on total monthly income 
can be taken as a proxy to the main occupation earnings. In reality, this information 
might even be sub-estimated in rural areas, for instance, due to the exclusion of products 
and groceries not included in the total earnings. 
Jannuzzi indicates that information about earnings of the main occupation started 
to be collected in the 1980 Census. The various forms of earnings (main occupation, 
other occupations, retirement pension, real estate rental fee, donations, government 
benefits, and other sources) vary between the 1980 and 2000 Censuses. In general, these 
income variables allow a precise discrimination of earnings in the main occupation, for 
people with ten years of age or more, from other sources of earnings. 
For the 1970 Census information on total earnings was used in this study. For the 
1980–2000 Censuses, information on earnings of the main occupation was utilized. The 
1960 Census was not included in this analysis because information for earnings is 
categorized in the microdata, and not continuous as in the other Censuses. 
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A concern that arises with the use of earnings variables is the amount of missing 
values in the database. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of missing values of the selected 
earnings variable in each year by age-education group, as well as the total number of 
males by age-education group from 1970 to 2000. First, one can see that the percentage 
of missing values for the least educated group in all age groups increased through time. 
This might be an indication that the increase in education enrolment generates a reduction 
of the proportional amount of people joining the labor market while they are attending 
school. Moreover, data from the 1970 Census has a smaller percent of missing values 
compared to the other Censuses. The use of total earnings in 1970, which is the only 
variable available, might reduce the amount of missing variables. On the other hand, the 
use of earnings of the main occupation in the 1980–2000 Censuses is demonstrating that 
this variable has a greater proportion of missing values than the one in 1970. However, 
differences in the proportion of missing values across years, as well as across age-
education groups, are controlled in the estimated regression models by the inclusion of 
indicator variables for each one of these groups and years. Furthermore, possible 
variation in the proportion of missing earnings across micro-regions is also controlled by 
the use of fixed-effects models, which estimate one coefficient for each one of these 
areas, as it will be explained below. 
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Table 3.2. Distribution of Missing Values of Earnings by Age-Education Group and 
Year, and Total Number of Observations+, 1970–2000. 
Age-Education Group 1970 1980 1991 2000 Total 
15–24 years 
























































































































































+ Information between parentheses is the total number of observations un-weighted in the age-education group by year. 
The other numbers refer to the percent of missing values in the total amount of observations of each table cell. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
All nominal amounts are calculated in the currency as of January 2002. To 
account for currency changes, wages in 1970 and 1980 were divided by 
2,750,000,000,000; and in 1991, they were divided by 2,750,000, as suggested by 
Corseuil and Foguel (2002). This correction was followed by the use of deflators 
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suggested by the same authors (wages were then divided by 0.00000000000026439 in 
1970; 0.0000000000057782 in 1980; 0.000067602304350 in 1991; and 
0.902716061809642 in 2000). In 1960, wages would have been divided by 
2,750,000,000,000,000 to account for currency changes; and by 0.0000000000000068879 
for inflation correction. Both adjustments for currency changes and for deflation are done 
for convenience only. Taking logarithms of wages, using nominal or real wages, 
generates the same estimates of the crucial parameters. 
Table 3.3 presents mean real monthly earnings of males by age-education group 
and year. The analysis of this table has to take into account that levels and patterns of 
mean earnings might be influenced by great variations among individuals, within each 
age-education group. Keeping this in mind, these mean earnings are still a useful 
instrument to have an initial idea of differences across groups over time. As expected, 
earnings are greater for better educated and older males. The increase in the means of 
earnings from 1970 to 1980 is justified by the great economic growth experienced in 
Brazil during the 1970s. Because of the economic recession in the 1980s, earnings 
dropped in 1991. From 1991 to 2000, mean earnings increased for the least educated 
males in all age groups, and for the highest educated males in the oldest group. For the 
other groups, earnings dropped slightly from 1991 to 2000, resulting in smaller disparities 
across education groups within each age group in 2000. 
Because of the great variation in income distribution in Brazil, the dependent 
variable in all models is the logarithm of mean real earnings in a group defined by micro-
region, age-education cell and year. In order to minimize potential problems of 
heteroskedasticity, cells containing fewer than 25 males receiving earnings are excluded 
from the regression analyses. Time refers to four different Censuses used in the study: 
1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000. 
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Table 3.3. Mean Real Monthly Earnings of Male Population by Year and Age-Education 
Group, 1970–2000+. 
Age-education 
Group 1970 1980 1991 2000 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 158.54 276.29 196.05 213.23 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 285.87 359.01 261.94 250.15 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 530.31 641.81 428.00 361.56 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 227.16 439.51 289.52 303.49 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 585.02 818.99 472.21 459.94 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,183.87 1,562.22 894.31 834.13 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 273.56 551.83 381.59 394.58 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 845.03 1,316.54 755.74 668.49 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,661.43 2,348.69 1,557.74 1,482.51 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 275.46 553.77 380.52 436.81 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 978.13 1,587.19 918.25 913.82 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,724.94 2,823.26 1,826.73 2,080.80 
Total 711.47 1,093.98 694.56 699.24 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and 
inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
This analysis was done using models in which there was a fixed-effect for each 
micro-region. These areas were first homogenized by Potter et al (2002) in 518 areas, in 
order to have comparable areas across the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1991 Censuses. To 
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incorporate the 2000 Census, micro-regions were redefined by the same authors into 502 
comparable areas across Brazil. In Potter et al’s study, the: 
(...) model has 518 intercept terms (one per micro-region), and its slope 
coefficients β represent the average fertility effects of unit changes in indicators, 
holding location constant. In essence, with the fixed-effects model, any persistent 
variability in fertility between micro-regions are net out, so that estimated 
coefficients reflect relationships within micro-regions over time. The fixed-effects 
model exploits the fact that identical locations are observed more than once and 
produces estimates that reflect observed, rather than ‘synthetic,’ changes in 
fertility and development indicators (Potter et al 2002, p.748). 
In the case of the present research, fixed-effects models will determine how 
changes in the independent variables over time will alter local labor outcomes. 
Throughout the estimation, I only use data on the male population. This is 
restrictive, but it concentrates on a group whose labor-force participation is relatively 
unresponsive to wages, and thus buttresses the treating quantities as exogenous. With this 
restriction (and, of course, with the exclusion of information on capital stocks by area), 
there is the implicit assumption of separability of the inputs of male workers of various 
types from other inputs. More specifically, Hamermesh explains that: 
(...) the availability of data also dictates that many studies exclude measures of the 
stock of capital. For the same reason other studies concentrate on the demand for 
one or several types of workers and exclude much of the total input of labor from 
the estimation. (...) There is nothing inherently wrong with ignoring capital or 
some part of the work force, assuming problems of separability are resolved. 
Estimates of factor-demand or factor-price elasticities are readily interpretable, 
but they must be interpreted carefully. Otherwise, one will, for example, 
underestimate own-price demand elasticities and infer that two groups of labor are 
greater p-substitutes than they in fact are (Hamermesh 1993, pp.67–68). 
In the case of own-quantity elasticities of factor price, the misleading 
interpretation would suppose that two groups of labor are greater q-complements than 
real trends. Greater p-substitutability and q-complementarity estimates would lead to 
uninteresting results, such as it will be explained in following sections. 
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Although the calculation of all variables used in the models took into account 
sample weights available in the microdata, weights were not used in the fixed-effects 
estimates. In other words, because fixed-effects models reflect relationships within 
micro-regions over time, between-micro-region sample variations are excluded from the 
analysis. 
In terms of this econometric matter, the appropriate weight to use in regression 
estimates should have been the square-root of the number of men with earnings in each 
micro-region, age, education, and year cell. Since the use of weights in a regression 
model is applied to all coefficients, including the constant, this would imply that the 
constant would vary for each micro-region over time. However, the use of weights is not 
allowed in fixed effects models, because the constant does not vary over time within the 
variable taken for fixed-effect estimates (in this case the micro-region). 
A substantial problem might emerge in the regression models if the impacts of 
proportions of men by age-education groups on earnings change according to the 
population size of the micro-region. If the impacts do not vary for different sizes of 
population in the areas, the new estimates will be similar to the original models. In this 
case, the functions are homothetic, and interactions of proportions with micro-region-size 
indicators do not need to be included in the models. Shephard explains that “a production 
function of the independent factor variables x1, x2, ..., xn will be called Homothetic, if it 
can be written Φ(σ(x1, x2, ..., xn)), where σ is a homogeneous function of degree one and 
Φ is a continuous positive monotone increasing function of σ.” (Shephard 1953, p.41) 
Thus, a function is homothetic in σ if it can be decomposed into an inner function that is 
monotonically increasing in σ and an outer function that is homogeneous of degree one in 
its argument. 
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As a strategy to take into account the influence of different population sizes of 
areas in the prediction of earnings, alternative models were also estimated using 
indicators for size of micro-regions. Micro-regions were divided into four groups, defined 
by the percentile distribution of their male population across Census years. The same 
micro-region might have changed its classification over time due to changes in 
population. In order to take into account population increases over time, as well as 
different sample sizes across Censuses, this classification utilized the quartile distribution 
of males receiving earnings in the micro-regions for each one of the years: in 1970 (from 
0 and less than 3,535; from 3,535 and less than 6,337; from 6,337 and less than 11,072; 
from 11,072 to 441,618); in 1980 (from 0 and less than 3,224; from 3,224 and less than 
6,420; from 6,420 and less than 11,390; from 11,390 to 625,985); in 1991 (from 0 and 
less than 2,348; from 2,348 and less than 4,161; from 4,161 and less than 7,433; from 
7,433 to 283,717); and in 2000 (from 0 and less than 2,326; from 2,326 and less than 
4,337; from 4,337 and less than 8,050; from 8,050 to 291,405). Population sizes of micro-
regions are smaller in the 1991 and 2000 Censuses, compared to the other ones, because 




Chapter 4. Formulation of the research design 
REVIEW OF SOME ECONOMIC TERMS AND TRENDS 
Elasticity 
In order to better understand the models estimated in this study, some basic 
economic terms will be explained within this section. One central term used to interpret 
models is elasticity, which is a tool that is used to describe the relationship between two 
variables. Elasticity is defined as the ratio of the percentage change in a dependent 
variable to a percentage change in an independent variable. For example, an elasticity of -
2 means that an increase by one percent in the independent variable provokes a fall of 
two percent in the dependent variable. Elasticities can be estimated for price, income, 
prices of related products, and advertising expenditures. Elasticity is then a measure of 
responsiveness of one variable to another used in economics, and can be calculated for 
any two related variables 
Own-price elasticity of factor demand curve measures how responsive the 
quantity demanded of good X is to the price of good X. In other words, own-price 
elasticity is the ratio of the percentage change in quantity demanded to the percentage 
change in price. The own-price elasticity is negative (demand curves slope down) and can 
take on any value from 0 to -∞. The demand curve is perfectly inelastic when the own-
price elasticity is zero. Demand is price inelastic if a one-percent increase in price leads 
to less than a one percent drop in quantity demanded (between zero and -1). The demand 
curve is unit elastic when the own-price elasticity equals -1. Demand is price elastic if a 
one-percent increase in price leads to more than one percent drop in quantity demanded 
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(between -1 and -∞). Finally, the demand curve is perfectly (or infinitely) elastic if the 
own-price elasticity is -∞ (Perloff 2006, chapter 3). 
There are four basic elasticities used in principles of economics: (1) own-price 
elasticity of factor demand (also called own-price elasticity of labor demand or own-wage 
demand elasticity) is a measure of the percentage change in the quantity demanded 
caused by a percentage change in price. Because the demand function is an inverse 
relationship between price and quantity the coefficient of price elasticity is always 
negative; (2) cross-price elasticity of demand is a measure of how a change in the price of 
good Y will change the quantity demanded of good X; (3) income elasticity of demand is 
the percentage by which the quantity demanded will change if the buyer’s income rises 
by one percent; (4) elasticity of supply is a measure of the responsiveness of sellers to 
changes in the price of a good. 
 
Inverse demand function 
The equations estimated in this study (explained in detail in following sections) 
are essentially inverse demand functions, which are derivable from the production 
function. The first set of equations that will be estimated have only own-quantities, 
concerning the fraction of people in area i at time t in the particular age-education cell c. 
In other equations, cross-quantity effects are included, constituting in a vector of ten 
additional variables showing the fraction of workers in other age-education cells, with 
one cell left out as a reference (if own-effect is included). Thus, in this second equation 
there will be 11 variables in total. This equation then allows the wage of workers in group 
c to depend not only on the fraction of workers in group c, but also on the distribution of 
workers across all the other groups. Thus a test of whether the distribution outside one’s 
own group affects one’s wage is a test of the significance of the additional cross-quantity 
 44
vector. There are restrictions on the sum of the coefficients across equations on each 
quantity, as well as restrictions on the sum within each equation. For example, if one 
increases the quantity of a particular type of labor by one percent, the effects are 
constrained by the sum of the shares (elasticity of complementary). In the case of the 
equation including cross-effects, if one is positive, the other must be negative. These 
equations can be estimated for each age-education group. However, if one includes the 
other age-education-groups’ distributions, in a pooled form, this becomes a system of 
inverse demand equations. 
In order to understand inverse demand functions, some previous studies can be 
used to elucidate it. The main point is that ordinary demand functions qi=qi(pl,...,pn,Y) 
can be inverted to originate inverse demand functions pi=pi(ql,...,qn,Y) (McKenzie 1977). 
Some explanations are also made by Pearce (1964) who uses the following 
notations. The commodity vector x is a set of quantities (x1, x2,...,xn) of n goods 
constituting a bundle to be consumed in a given time period. The price of the ith 
individual good is symbolized by pi. Moreover, because y is a more familiar notation, 
when income (y) and consumption (C) are not distinguished, the symbol y means C (in 
this case, C is the total estimated money spent in the time period, or Cn, also referred as 
the annual income). Current consumption of any commodity is dependent on all prices 
and total spending, rather than on current income. Pearce explains that: 
(...) under market conditions the individual can choose a unique commodity 
bundle. This gives demand functions, i.e. a vector value function relating every 
commodity bundle to prices and spending, written: x=f(p,y). By definition of y, 
this function is also subject to the budget condition (p,x)=y (...) the consumer, 
when faced with a set of prices, can and does select, with some degree of 
certainty, a particular commodity bundle (...) At this point it is usual to assume 
that the function [x=f(p,y)] possesses an inverse. In other words, given any 
commodity bundle x0 and some y0, there is a unique set of prices p0 which will 
just induce the consumer to buy x0. (...) The attempt was made, therefore, to work 
backwards and to infer the existence of a quasi-utility function from the fact that 
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individuals choose in the market. (...) The inverse of [x=f(p,y)] will give us pi as a 
function of all x’s and y, and there are good empirical reasons for suspecting this 
function to be homogeneous of order one in y. pi/y is a function of x’s alone. Thus 
if we write the differential equation Σpidxi=0 we can, by multiplication by an 
appropriate factor, eliminate y (Pearce 1964, pp.66–67). 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) also deal with the discussion about demand 
functions. They explain that the demand for a particular good depends on, among other 
things, the price at which a firm sells its products, which constitutes the demand function. 
However, in order to generate models that are easier to explain, economists estimate the 
inverse demand function, in which the price depends on the demand for a particular good. 
 
Own- and cross-price elasticities of labor demand & own- and cross-quantity 
elasticities of factor price 
In some cases, labor demand does not affect wages — for example when all 
employment is unionized, or where the supply of labor to a sub-sector is perfectly elastic 
(the percentage change in quantity demanded is totally explained by the percentage 
change in price, i.e. factor prices are exogenous). In circumstances such as these, wage 
elasticities of labor demand allow the estimation of effects of exogenous changes of wage 
rates on the amount of labor employers demand to use. Then labor-demand-relations 
estimates provide own-price elasticities of labor demand (also known as own-wage 
factor-demand elasticities), which estimate the impact of changes in the price of one type 
of labor on its employment; as well as cross-price effects that estimate this impact on the 
employment of other types of labor (Hamermesh 1986). 
In other cases, wages do not affect labor demand, i.e. the employment of workers 
of a particular type is constant, and determined by the completely inelastic supply of 
those workers to the market (the percentage change in the wage rate of workers is 
completely determined by the percentage change of their labor demanded, i.e. factor 
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quantities are exogenous). In this way, quantity elasticities of factor price indicate the 
impact of exogenous changes of the demand for labor on wage rates. Then the shape of 
the labor-demand function provides own-quantity elasticities of factor price (also known 
as own-factor-price elasticities) which estimate the impact of exogenous changes in 
supply (due to changes in the labor force demographic structure, or to changes in the 
preferences of workers for entering different occupations, for example) on the wage rate 
of these workers in the group whose supply has changed; as well as cross-quantity effects 
that estimate this impact on the wage of other groups (Hamermesh 1986). 
The importance of analyzing the relationship between exogenous changes of 
wages and the determination of employment, as well as exogenous changes of 
inelastically supplied labor and the structure of relative wages, is described by 
Hamermesh: 
The derivation of factor-demand relationships with more than two inputs is of 
general interest to economists and should be of particular interest to labor 
economists when labor is one of those inputs. In that case we can tell, for 
example, how employment or wages are affected when the price or quantity of 
any one of several other inputs changes. It is useful to labor economists when we 
disaggregate labor along some interesting dimension, for example, age, race, sex, 
education, immigrant status, skill, occupation. In that case the theory of 
production with several inputs allows us to infer how changes in the wage rate of 
one group of workers affect the demand for labor in other groups (following the 
first polar approach to studying demand, that factor prices are exogenous); or how 
changes in the supply of one group affect the returns to other types of workers 
(following the second approach, with factor quantities exogenous) (Hamermesh 
1993, pp.33–34). 
The own- and cross-partial elasticities of factor demand are symbolized by 
ηij=δlnXi/δlnwj, with respect to a change in wage rate wj. When ηij<0 for j ≠ i, “an 
increase in the wage rate of one group of workers with output constant might reduce 
employment of one or more other groups of workers as well as that of the workers whose 
wage rate has increased.” (Hamermesh 1993, p.36) 
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The own- and cross-partial elasticities of factor price are characterized by 
εij=δlnwi/δlnXj, with respect to a change in the quantity Xj. When εij<0 for j ≠ i: 
(...) an exogenous increase in the quantity of input j reduces the price of input i at 
a constant marginal cost. For example, an influx of new immigrants into a labor 
market must raise the wage rate of at least one other group of workers, or increase 
the rate of return to capital; but it could lower the wage received by some other 
group of workers (presumably a group that competes for jobs with the new 
immigrants) (Hamermesh 1993, p.37). 
 
Complementarity and substitution 
To understand the complementarity and substitution between inputs, some 
considerations have to be made. In order to attain a given level of production, conditional 
demands are the quantities of each input that a firm wants to utilize. In order to maximize 
its profit, unconditional demands are the quantities of each input that a firm wants to use. 
Such as proposed by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), let the production function of 
the firm be F(K,L), where K is capital, energy, and raw materials (referred below only as 
capital); and L represents a single aggregate of labor. On one hand, if in a given level of 
output (Y), capital and labor always have to be combined in the same proportion, capital 
and labor are complementary. In other words, the ratio K/L remains a constant 
independent of Y. Labor and capital are gross complements if an increase in the price of a 
factor implies a reduction in the unconditional demand for both labor and capital. Two 
factors are p-complements if the conditional demand for one of them decreases if the cost 
of the other factor rises. On the other hand, if capital and labor can be combined in 
different proportions to reach a certain production level (Y), then they are substitutable. 
Labor and capital are gross substitutes when an increase in the price of a factor leads the 
firm to reduce the unconditional demand for this factor and increase the demand for the 
other. Two factors are p-substitutes if the conditional demand for one of them increases 
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when the cost of the other factor increases. If the production function has only two inputs, 
then they are inevitably p-substitutes. 
Using the partial elasticities of demand and of factor prices, as well as different 
terms based on whether factor prices (p) or quantities (q) are experiencing exogenous 
changes, the relationships within pairs of factor inputs can be classified. For partial 
elasticities of labor demand (ηij, factor price is exogenous), if ηij<0, inputs i and j are p-
complements; if ηij>0, they are p-substitutes. All input pairs (i,j) can be p-substitutes, but 
if one pair is p-complement, the problem is more interesting. For partial elasticities of 
factor price (εij, quantity is exogenous), if εij>0, inputs i and j are q-complements; if εij<0, 
they are q-substitutes. All input pairs (i,j) can be q-complements, but the motivation 
happens when at least one pair is q-substitute. 
Some examples may help demonstrate the use of these definitions. If educated 
and uneducated workers are p-substitutes, one may infer that a rise in the cost to 
employers of employing the low-wage, uneducated labor, perhaps resulting from 
an increase in the minimum wage, will increase the fraction of educated workers 
used at each level of production. These two factors may also be q-complements. If 
so, an increase in the relative supply of educated workers (perhaps resulting from 
increased awareness of the non-pecuniary benefits of acquiring a college 
education) will raise the relative wage of uneducated workers by making them 
relatively more productive (Hamermesh 1993, p.38). 
 
Effects of education and demographic shocks on elasticities of labor demand and 
factor price 
Such as discussed by Hamermesh (1993, chapter 3) unskilled workers are easier 
to substitute for capital than skilled labor. In other words, own-price elasticities of labor 
demand are greater for unskilled than for skilled workers. In this way, capital and skill 
are p-complements, in which p-substitution for capital is greater for less-educated 
workers. On the other hand, own-quantity elasticities of factor-price are greater for highly 
educated workers. 
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Considering previous studies, Hamermesh indicates that: 
(...) it seems fairly safe to conclude that additional education reduces the degree of 
p-substitutability of labor with capital services and reduces the labor-demand 
elasticity. There is strong evidence for capital-skill p-complementarity (and 
relative q-substitutability). (...) [Moreover] both capital deepening and more rapid 
installation of newer capital equipment raise the share of more educated labor. 
These suggest that educated labor is relatively more q-complementary with capital 
and with newer technology than unskilled labor (Hamermesh 1993, p.117). 
Some studies have been considering the effects of how changes in population and 
the demographic structure of the labor force affect relative wages. The interest has been 
on evaluating the influence of increasing female labor-force participation, as well as 
changing the relative supply of young workers on their own wages and employment, and 
on that of other groups. Influences of minimum wage and other policies on the 
employment of younger workers have also been analyzed. Important studies in the United 
States have also been done on how alterations in immigration patterns affect the wages 
and employment of native workers (Hamermesh 1993). 
An interesting aspect of the impact of exogenous changes in population structure 
on wage rates is the finding that changes in the relative supply of one group does not 
significantly affect wages of workers in other groups, as has been elucidated by small 
cross-elasticities of complementarity in almost all pairs of groups. The implication of 
studies in the United States is that increases of female labor force participation, younger 
workers, or even skilled workers in the labor force do not have large effects on the 
relative wages of other groups (Hamermesh 1993). Finally, large changes in the labor-
force cohort size significantly affect earnings of the cohort, but in a small manner, such 
as have been shown by weak own-quantity elasticities in previous studies (Welch 1979; 
Berger 1985). 
Evaluating the impact of immigrants that entered the United States between 1980 
and 2000 on wage, Borjas (2003) estimates factor-price elasticities that require 
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information on factor shares, and hold marginal cost, capital stock and quantities of other 
factors constant. Borjas evaluates: (1) own-factor price elasticities, giving the wage 
impact of an increase in the supply of workers with education i and experience j; (2) 
cross-factor price elasticities within an education group, giving the impact on the wage of 
group (i,j) of an increase in the supply of group (i,j’), with j ≠ j’; and (3) cross-factor 
price elasticities across education groups, giving the impact on the wage of group (i,j) of 
an increase in the supply of group (i’,j’), with i ≠ i’ and j=(1,...,j,...8). Borjas’ main 
finding is that: 
(...) the large immigrant influx of the 1980s and 1990s adversely affected the 
wage of most native workers, particularly those workers at the bottom and top of 
the education distribution. The wage fell by 8.9 percent for high school dropouts 
and by 4.9 percent for college graduates. In contrast, the wage of high school 
graduates fell by only 2.6 percent, while the wage of workers with some college 
was barely affected. Overall, the immigrant influx reduced the wage of the 
average native worker by 3.2 percent (Borjas 2003, p.1368). 
This result is in opposition to previous ones, because it suggests that wage and 
labor supply of competing native labor force is affected by immigration flows. 
 
SPECIFICATION OF DEMAND SYSTEMS 
After aggregating the microdata by micro-region, age-education, and year cells, as 
well as getting information on mean income and number of men in each cell, and 
proportion of men in each age-education group by year and micro-region, fixed-effects 
models were generated using the following formulations. 
Let W be the logarithm of wages and X be an independent variable or vector of 
independent variables. Let i denote a micro-region, t denote time (Census year), and c 
denote a cell (an age-education group). The simplest model is: 
(1) Witc = β0c + β1Xitc + υic  +  θtc  + εitc , i = 1,…,K; t = 1,…,T, 
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where υi is a vector of area fixed effects and θt is a vector of time fixed effects. β1 
estimates the impact of idiosyncratic variations in relative endowments of labor classified 
by age and education on wage rates. The formulation in (1) restricts each own-quantity 
effect (essentially an elasticity of factor prices) to be independent of variations in the 
relative sizes of the other eleven age-education groups. Equation (1) might be estimated 
as twelve different regressions, one for each age-education cell; instead, all twelve are 
pooled and estimated (1) in a single regression, including the proportions of people in 
each of the age-education groups, eleven indicators for age-education groups, and three 
for Census years. The reference group is workers ages 15–24 with zero to four years of 
schooling observed in the 1970 Census. An even simpler version of (1) would exclude 
both area and time fixed effects. 
Model (1) is highly restrictive in setting all cross-quantity effects to zero. An 
approach that allows for cross-quantity effects, and thus accords more closely with theory 
by explicitly allowing labor-labor substitution (Hamermesh 1993, chapter 2), is: 
(2) Witc = β0 + β1Xitc + β2Xitc’ + υi + θt + εitc , i = 1,…,K; t = 1,…,T, 
where c’ refers to the other age-education cells. This formulation –– a complete 
system of inverse labor-demand equations –– allows for substitution parameters that 
indicate how a change in the fraction of the population in one cell alters the wage of 
people in any other cell. Equation (2) contains ten terms in Xitc’. A pooled version is 
estimated including all cross-proportions of people for each of the twelve age-education 
groups (11x12=132 coefficients), eleven indicators for age-education groups, and three 
indicators for Census years. Of course, one could estimate both (1) and (2) without the 
area and time fixed effects, but that restriction is not imposed anywhere in the material 
presented here. 
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Some of the restrictive assumptions in (1) and (2) can be relaxed still further. 
First, the production parameters can be allowed to vary over time. With this relaxation (1) 
becomes: 
(1’) Witc = β0 + β1Xitc + β3θtXitc + υi + θt + εitc , i = 1,…,K; t = 1,…,T. 
This specification interacts the X variables with the time indicators and allows 
testing whether the own-elasticities of factor price are unchanged over time. As such, (1’) 
nests the simpler specification (1). The pooled version of (1’) has twelve proportions of 
people in each one of the age-education groups, eleven indicators for age-education 
groups, three for Census years, and interactions between proportions and year indicators 
(12x3=36 coefficients). 
A model analogous to (2) that allows all the substitution parameters to vary over 
time by adding both own-quantity interactions with the T-1 time indicators and 
interactions of the cross-quantity terms with those indicators is: 
(2’) Witc = β0 + β1Xitc + β2Xitc’ + β3θtXitc + β4θtXitc’ + υi + θt + εitc , i = 1,…,K; t = 1,…,T. 
Note that (2’) nests each of Equations (1), (2) and (1’). The pooled form of (2’) 
can be estimated in a single regression, including all cross-proportions of workers for 
each age-education group and their interactions with the time indicators. In all four of 
these models one could expand the specifications still further by allowing for time-
varying area fixed effects. This re-specification controls for changing area-specific 
effects. Re-estimates of all four equations suggest that this alternative did not affect the 
demand parameters on which this study is focused. The pooled equation of (2’) includes 
all cross-proportions of people for each of the twelve age-education groups (11x12=132 
coefficients), eleven indicators for age-education groups, three for Census years, and 
interactions between cross-proportions and year indicators (132x3=396 coefficients). 
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Less general formulations of Equations (1’) and (2’) would simply take a 
continuous time indicator, TIME, going from 1 to T, and interact it instead of each of the 
dummies θt with the Xitc in Equation (1) and with Xitc and Xitc’ in Equation (2). Those 
formulations implicitly allow for linear trends in the production parameters. 
The most general formulations that make sense would take Equations (1’) and (2’) 
and allow for the possibility of area-specific trends (υi) in the production parameters. 
Thus one might generalize still further and estimate: 
(1”) Witc = β0 + β1Xitc + β3TIMEtXitc + β5υiTIMEtXitc + υi + θt + εitc , i = 1…K; t = 1…T. 
Here one might even like to allow for time-specific and area-specific production 
parameters by interacting the Xitc with the vector θt instead of with the continuous 
variable TIME in Equation (1”). That could be done; but such an extensive formulation 
means estimating separate production parameters for each area (υi) in each time period 
(θt), something that is not likely to be very productive. As it is, the formulation in 
Equation (1”) implies that there are separate production parameters for each area, but that 
in each area the production parameter is characterized by a linear trend. Of course, one 
would use this and (1’) to test for the significance of the β5, the area-specific trends in the 
production parameters. 
Finally, one can take the same track with the more general versions in Equations 
(2) and (2’) and estimate: 
(2”) Witc = β0 + β1Xitc + β2Xitc’ + β3TIMEtXitc + β4TIMEtXitc’ + β5υiTIMEtXitc + 
β6υiTIMEtXitc’ + υi + θt + εitc , i = 1…K; t = 1…T. 
This formulation allows for time trends in area-specific production parameters 
describing both own- and cross-substitution effects. 
Throughout this series of specifications, the analysis has moved from the simplest 
formulation, Equation (1) excluding area or time fixed effects, to increasingly general 
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formulations. Each complication allows us to test the validity of the restrictions imposed 
in earlier specifications. Even the most complex specification (2’) is not as general as it 
could be were still better data available. There is no a priori reason to specify constant 
marginal cost, but it is implicit in the formulations here and is necessitated by the absence 
of any information on the scale of production in each area. Similarly, if there were 
measures of capital stocks available by area (Grant and Hamermesh 1981), the implicit 
assumption of separability of the examined inputs from capital could be removed by the 
inclusion of capital stocks information in the model. 
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Chapter 5. Descriptive statistics and estimates 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
As discussed above, the age distribution of the population of Brazil has been 
changing rapidly. Figure 3.1, based on UN estimates and projections, shows the evolution 
of the child and old-age dependency ratios from 1950 to 2050. The child dependency 
ratio has fallen dramatically, and will continue to decrease significantly in the next 
decades. However, the old-age dependency ratio has been increasing since 2000, and will 
increase even more in coming years. These patterns are related to the decline in the total 
fertility rate since the 1960s (Table 3.1). Since fertility declined so abruptly, the shares of 
younger age groups also declined. 
Differences in the timing and speed of the fertility transition led to substantial 
temporal variations in the age distribution across regions, states and municipalities. 
Figures 5.1 to 5.12 illustrate the proportion of males in twelve age-education groups in all 
502 Brazilian micro-regions for 1970–2000 Censuses. In order to calculate these 
proportions, only males ages 15–64 were considered in the denominator for each year and 
micro-region. For a better understanding of the figures, micro-regions are ordered by five 
Brazilian regions: North (NO), Northeast (NE), Southeast (SE), South (SO) and Center-
West (CW). 
Figures 5.1, 5.4, 5.7 and 5.10 demonstrate proportions of males in the lowest 
education group in four different age groups. In general, these figures show that the 
proportion of males with zero to four years of schooling has been decreasing in all micro-
regions. This decline is greater for the youngest group (15–24), young adults (25–34) and 
adults (35–49), but also noticeable for mature adults (50–64). Areas in the Southeast and 
South of Brazil show a greater decrease in the proportion of men in low-educated groups 
than do the North and Northeast. 
Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.8, 5.9, 5.11 and 5.12 demonstrate the proportion of 
males with five to eight years of schooling, and at least nine years of schooling. There is 
a clear increase over time in the proportion of males with higher educational attainment. 
At the same time, differences among micro-regions are pronounced and persistent. 
Higher proportions in these age-education groups are observed in the Southeastern, 
Southern, and Center-Western areas, compared to Northern and Northeastern areas. 
 




Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figures 5.13 and 5.14 present the age distributions for 12 selected micro-regions 
in 1970 and 2000. (Data are shown only for these two years to allow a clearer picture of 
the changes.) The curves for the Northeastern micro-regions (in Piauí, Pernambuco, 
Ceará, Paraíba and Bahia) indicate that the age distributions in 1970 and 2000 were 
similar, unlike the Southeastern (Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), the 
Southern (Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul) and the Center-Western (Goiás) micro-regions, 
where the proportions in the older age groups grew from 1970 to 2000. 
Figure 5.15 and 5.16 illustrates the distribution of the male population by 
education for 1970 and 2000 for the same micro-regions. In general, the proportion of 
men with higher levels of schooling grew over the years. Furthermore, the Northeastern 
micro-regions have lower levels of education than the micro-regions in the South, 
Southeast and Center-West. 
The changes in the distribution of educational attainment between the 1970 and 
2000 Brazilian Censuses were substantial in all regions. Changes in the age distribution 
were also observed in the same period, at least in areas in the Southeast, South and 
Center-West of the country. The crucial point is not only that there were profound 
demographic changes in Brazil over this period in both the age structure and educational 
attainment, but also that these proceeded at different rates in different parts of the 
country. These variations allow us to identify the labor-demand parameters, and thus to 
expand the study of the labor-market effects of the demographic dividend. Also, the 
persistent differences in levels suggest the need to use models that account for specific 
local factors through the use of fixed effects for micro-regions. 
 
Figure 5.13. Changes in the Age Distribution in Selected Micro-regions (Northeast), 1970 
and 2000. 
Baixo Parnaíba & Litoral Piauiense - Piauí 
Northeast 
Garanhuns - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
Cariri - Ceará 
Northeast 
Mata Setentrional - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
Campina Grande - Paraíba 
Northeast 
Ilhéus-Itabuna - Bahia 
Northeast 
Source: 1970 and 2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.14. Changes in the Age Distribution in Selected Micro-regions (Southeast, 
South, Center-West), 1970 and 2000. 
Uberlândia - Minas Gerais 
Southeast 
Maringá - Paraná 
South 
Volta Redonda - Rio de Janeiro 
Southeast 
Porto Alegre - Rio Grande do Sul 
South 
São José do Rio Preto - São Paulo 
Southeast 
Anápolis - Goiás 
Center-West 
Source: 1970 and 2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.15. Changes in the Education Distribution in Selected Micro-regions 
(Northeast), 1970 and 2000. 
Baixo Parnaíba & Litoral Piauiense - Piauí 
Northeast 
Garanhuns - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
Cariri - Ceará 
Northeast 
Mata Setentrional - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
Campina Grande - Paraíba 
Northeast 
Ilhéus-Itabuna - Bahia 
Northeast 
Source: 1970 and 2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
 
 71
Figure 5.16. Changes in the Education Distribution in Selected Micro-regions (Southeast, 
South, Center-West), 1970 and 2000. 
Uberlândia - Minas Gerais 
Southeast 
Maringá - Paraná 
South 
Volta Redonda - Rio de Janeiro 
Southeast 
Porto Alegre - Rio Grande do Sul 
South 
São José do Rio Preto - São Paulo 
Southeast 
Anápolis - Goiás 
Center-West 




ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS ON LABOR-MARKET OUTCOMES 
Since there are 502 micro-regions, 12 age-education groups and four Censuses, 
the maximum number of possible observations in the regressions is 24,096. However, the 
requirement that there be at least 25 men with earnings in a micro-region in a cell, results 
in the exclusion of 4,369 observations, so that there are 19,727 observations throughout. 
Table 5.1 shows the percent of male population by year and age-education groups 
in Brazil. In general, the numbers indicate that the proportion of people with zero to four 
years of schooling fell from 1960 to 2000. For example, the proportion of people between 
15–24 years of age, and 0–4 years of schooling dropped considerably from 30.8 percent 
in 1960 to 9.0 percent in 2000, a decrease of more than three times. Moreover, 
proportions of people with five to eight years of schooling, as well as those with at least 
nine years of schooling increased during the period. The highest increases in proportion 
of men with at least nine years of education were the ones for individuals with 15–24 
years, from 1.1 percent in 1960 to 10.2 percent in 2000, and for those with 35–49 years of 
age, from 0.9 to 8.5, increases of more than nine times in forty years. 
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Table 5.1. Percent of Male Population by Year and Age-Education Group, 1960–2000. 
Age-education 
Group 1960 1970 1980 1991 2000 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 30.84 28.19 20.59 14.61 9.04 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 2.63 5.38 10.53 12.09 12.46 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 1.08 2.74 5.87 5.97 10.24 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 22.66 19.71 16.39 12.41 8.82 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 1.18 1.98 3.90 6.82 7.63 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 1.19 2.00 4.77 7.40 8.12 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 24.47 22.66 19.02 17.11 13.32 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 0.98 1.62 2.39 3.67 6.73 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 0.91 1.59 2.84 5.54 8.46 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 13.21 12.84 11.72 11.49 10.36 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 0.43 0.65 0.94 1.16 1.99 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 0.40 0.62 1.05 1.72 2.84 
Total 4,039,107+ 25,760,600 32,613,947 43,434,534 53,177,963 
+ The 25-percent-sample microdata of the 1960 Census does not have sample weight variable to estimate size of population. 
Source: 1960–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
Table 5.2 shows estimates of a model that includes only indicators for age-
education group. This model calculates changes in relative earnings in line with a 
Mincerian equation, which estimates the influence of years of schooling and experience 
on the earnings function. This is an extremely restrictive model, because it does not take 
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into account the effects of changes in the size of each group on its earnings. The indicator 
variables for age-education groups show that within each age category earnings are 
higher for those people with more schooling. For instance, men ages 25–34 with zero to 
four years of schooling earn 1.46 times [exp(0.38)] what men ages 15–24 with same 
education (the reference category) earn. Young adults (25–34) with at least nine years of 
schooling earn 5.05 times more [exp(1.62)]. The estimates are thus consistent with what 
is known about age-earnings profiles and the impact of education on them. 
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Table 5.2. Fixed-Effects Estimates Including Only Year and Age-Education Indicators, 









Age-education Indicators  
15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling –– 
15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling 0.31*** 
15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling 0.76*** 
25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.38*** 
25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling 0.99*** 
25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling 1.62*** 
35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.61*** 
35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.40*** 
35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling 2.11*** 
50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.63*** 
50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.58*** 
50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling 2.29*** 
  
N observations 19,727 
N groups 502 
Rho: Fraction of variance due to the υi 0.66 
F (14; 19,211): All coefficients=0 12,941.99*** 
F (501; 19,211): Area fixed effects=0 65.13*** 
* Significant at p<.05; ** Significant at p<.01; *** Significant at p<.001. 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account 
changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
Table 5.3 presents estimates of Equation (1). The age-education indicators follow 
the same pattern of Table 5.2. The improvement from the last results is the inclusion of 
coefficients that take into account the effects of changes in the size of age-education 
groups on their earnings. The estimated coefficients of the proportions of men in each 
age-education group (the β1) generally suggest greater negative impacts as the amount of 
education embodied in a worker increases. In order to interpret these coefficients, it is 
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necessary to calculate elasticities, because the proportions of men vary across age-
education groups over time (Table 5.1). These elasticities are presented in the final 
columns of Table 5.3. The results show that the elasticities of factor price are more 
negative among age-education groups with more education (five to eight years of 
schooling, and at least nine years of schooling). Moreover, the negative impacts increase 
over time among the more educated groups, while the elasticities for groups with the 
lowest educational attainment show decreases over time in the negative impact on 
earnings. 
As observed in Table 5.3, an increase of ten percent in the number of people with 
five to eight years of schooling and between 15 and 24 years of age reduces their earnings 
by 1.8 percent (-0.179) in 1970 and 4.1 percent in 2000. Among young adults (25–34) in 
the same education group, the impact of the same shock also increases over time, from a 
reduction of 1.2 percent in 1970 to 4.6 percent in 2000. The same happens for adults (35–
49) and older adults (50–64) with five to eight years of schooling. The elasticities in the 
highest education groups also demonstrate significant negative impacts on earnings. 
Older adults (50–64) with at least nine years of schooling, however, and even adults (35–
49) in this education group, see smaller negative impacts on earnings. 
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Table 5.3. Fixed-Effects Estimates of Equation (1), 1970–2000. Dependent Variable is 
log(Monthly Earnings)+. 
Variables Coefficients      
Constant 5.11***      
       
1970 ––      
1980 0.54***      
1991 0.15***      
2000 0.20***      
       
Age-education Indicators       
15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling ––      
15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling 0.59***      
15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling 0.97***      
25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.42***      
25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.22***      
25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling 1.80***      
35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.83***      
35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.58***      
35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling 2.17***      
50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.83***      
50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.70***  Elasticity 
50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling 2.24***  (based on the age-education 
   distribution of Table 5.1) 
Proportions of Men in Age-education Groups   1970 1980 1991 2000 
Ages 15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.08  -0.023 -0.016 -0.012 -0.007 
Ages 15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling -3.32***  -0.179 -0.350 -0.401 -0.414 
Ages 15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling -4.81***  -0.132 -0.282 -0.287 -0.492 
Ages 25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.37**  -0.073 -0.061 -0.046 -0.033 
Ages 25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling -6.00***  -0.119 -0.234 -0.409 -0.458 
Ages 25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling -5.37***  -0.107 -0.256 -0.398 -0.436 
Ages 35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling -1.19***  -0.270 -0.226 -0.204 -0.159 
Ages 35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling -7.23***  -0.117 -0.173 -0.265 -0.486 
Ages 35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling -3.08***  -0.049 -0.087 -0.171 -0.260 
Ages 50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling -1.66***  -0.213 -0.195 -0.191 -0.172 
Ages 50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling -16.12***  -0.105 -0.151 -0.187 -0.321 
Ages 50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling -0.25  -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 
       
N observations 19,727      
N groups 502      
Rho: Fraction of variance due to the υi 0.73      
F (26; 19,199): All coefficients=0 8,506.08***      
F (501; 19,199): Area fixed effects=0 57.02***      
* Significant at p<.05; ** Significant at p<.01; *** Significant at p<.001. 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Overall, the results show that an identical percentage-point increase in the 
proportion of people with more schooling generates larger negative impacts on earnings. 
This result is consistent with the substantial evidence from industrialized economies that 
own-price elasticities of labor demand fall with educational attainment and with the 
sparser evidence for those economies that elasticities of factor price rise with education 
(Hamermesh 1993, chapter 3). Moreover, that the factor-price elasticities have been 
increasing over time, except among the least-educated group, suggests either that a given 
amount of education implies that more skill is embodied in a group of workers now than 
in 1970, or that the Brazilian labor market has become more rigid. 
The estimates permit the comparison of the predicted mean monthly real earnings 
among different age-education groups over the range of the actual proportions of people 
in these groups in Brazilian micro-regions. Figure 5.17 exhibits predicted earnings for 
young men (25–34) with at least nine years of schooling, and for men (35–49) with zero 
to four years of schooling. Most importantly, these figures illustrate that earnings are 
lower among men who live in micro-regions with higher proportions of male workers in 
their own age-education group. The negative impact on earnings of a higher proportion of 
people in one’s own group is greater for young adults with 9+ years of education, as can 
be discerned by the steeper curves for them, compared to those for adults with less 
education. 
Moreover, as was expressed in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, proportions of males ages 25–
34 with at least nine years of schooling are increasing over time, while males ages 35–49 
with zero to four years of schooling show decreasing proportions from 1970 to 2000. As 
a result of the changing age-education distribution, as well as the greater negative impact 
of group size on earnings for better educated workers, the difference in real earnings 
between these two groups in Figure 5.17 is decreasing over time. 
Figure 5.17. Predicted Earnings+ from Equation (1) by Proportion of Men in Age-
Education Groups for 502 Micro-regions, Men 25–34 with 9+ Years of 
Schooling, and Men 35–49 with 0–4 Years of Schooling, 1970–2000. 
1970 1980 
1991 2000 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency, and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
Table 5.4 presents estimates of Equation (1’), which allows own-quantity effects 
to vary over time directly. Interactions with year indicators illustrate that the negative 
impacts of the changing distributions of workers across micro-regions have been 
decreasing. This is observed mainly for 1991 and 2000 for the least educated and the 
oldest group of workers. Among them the positive coefficients on the interaction terms 
essentially offset the negative coefficients on the main effect terms. Between the other 
groups, particularly the highest-educated and prime-age workers, the impacts of 
increasing shares of the work force remain negative throughout. 
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Table 5.4. Fixed-Effects Estimates of Equation (1’), 1970–2000. Dependent Variable is 
log(Monthly Earnings)+. 
Variables Coefficients 
Constant 5.30***    
     
1970 ––    
1980 0.45***    
1991 -0.06***    
2000 -0.05***    
     
Age-education Indicators     
15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling ––    
15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling 0.52***    
15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling 0.90***    
25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.44***    
25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.12***    
25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling 1.68***    
35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.75***    
35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.51***    
35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling 2.11***    
50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.77***    
50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling 1.61***    
50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling 2.23***    
  Interactions with Year 
Proportions of Men in Age-education Groups  1980 1991 2000 
Ages 15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.77*** 0.34*** 0.90*** 1.32*** 
Ages 15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling -5.08*** 0.71* 3.20*** 3.06*** 
Ages 15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling -4.82*** -1.18* 2.07*** 1.68** 
Ages 25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling -1.60*** 0.98*** 1.31*** 1.63*** 
Ages 25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling -6.81*** 0.20 2.87** 3.20*** 
Ages 25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling -1.43 -2.39** -0.93 -1.94* 
Ages 35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling -1.98*** 1.00*** 1.56*** 1.66*** 
Ages 35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling -8.67*** 0.74 2.72* 3.92*** 
Ages 35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling -4.63*** -1.04 3.67** 3.35** 
Ages 50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling -3.44*** 1.68*** 2.67*** 3.55*** 
Ages 50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling -8.66** -2.38 -1.30 1.48 
Ages 50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling -15.98*** 1.58 17.85*** 19.39*** 
     
N observations 19,727    
N groups 502    
Rho: Fraction of variance due to the υi 0.74    
F (62; 19,163): All coefficients=0 3,957.16***    
F (501; 19,163): Area fixed effects=0 53.20***    
* Significant at p<.05; ** Significant at p<.01; *** Significant at p<.001. 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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In one respect, results of Equation (1’) in Table 5.4 show that interaction terms 
only slightly offset the main negative effect for least educated workers. For men with 
zero to four years of schooling, the sum of the interaction term in 2000 to the main effect 
equals 0.55 (-0.77 + 1.32) for ages 15–24; 0.03 for ages 25–34; -0.32 for ages 35–49; and 
0.11 for ages 50–64. The only interaction term that generates a great positive impact on 
earnings is the one for the oldest workers with at least nine years of education, creating a 
final impact of 3.41 (-15.98 + 19.39) in 2000. In other words, the decrease in proportion 
of workers with low levels of education does not have a large, beneficial impact on their 
earnings. 
In another respect, these results illustrate that the negative effect of increasing 
shares on earnings for higher educated workers is still evident in 2000. Adding the main 
effect to the interaction term in 2000, workers with five to eight years of schooling 
present a negative effect of -2.02 (-5.08 + 3.06) for ages 15–24; -3.61 for ages 25–34; -
4.75 for ages 35–49; and -7.18 for ages 50–64. These large negative effects are also 
observed by the highest-educated workers, excluding the oldest group, such as mentioned 
above. 
To better understand the coefficients in Table 5.4, elasticities of factor price were 
estimated, taking into account the main own-share coefficient, the year interactions, and 
the national age-education distribution. These elasticities are shown in Table 5.5 and, 
such as the elasticities in Table 5.3, they imply that negative effects of the own-share 
proportions are more negative among groups with more education. Among the lowest 
educated groups, the elasticities present values even closer to zero over time than 
elasticities of Table 5.3. Results in Table 5.5 suggest that the proportions of least-skilled 
groups are becoming so small in the population that the supply side pressure on earnings 
no longer matters. 
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Table 5.5. Elasticities for Estimates of Equation (1’), Based on the National Age-
Education Distribution of Table 5.1, 1970–2000. Dependent Variable is 
log(Monthly Earnings)+. 
Proportions of Men in Age-education Groups Elasticity 
 1970 1980 1991 2000 
Ages 15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.217 -0.089 0.019 0.050 
Ages 15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling -0.273 -0.460 -0.227 -0.252 
Ages 15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling -0.132 -0.352 -0.164 -0.321 
Ages 25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.315 -0.102 -0.077 0.003 
Ages 25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling -0.135 -0.258 -0.451 -0.275 
Ages 25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling -0.029 -0.182 -0.283 -0.274 
Ages 35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.449 -0.186 -0.168 -0.043 
Ages 35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling -0.141 -0.189 -0.291 -0.320 
Ages 35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling -0.074 -0.161 -0.314 -0.108 
Ages 50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling -0.442 -0.206 -0.202 0.011 
Ages 50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling -0.056 -0.104 -0.128 -0.143 
Ages 50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling -0.100 -0.151 -0.247 0.097 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
Different from the findings in estimates of Table 5.3, elasticities in Table 5.5 
suggest that the negative impacts among the more educated groups do not have a smooth 
increasing trend over time. More specifically, negative impacts increase over time in 
those groups, but with eventual decreases from 1980 to 1991, and from 1991 to 2000. 
These findings are in line with previous analysis that even lower educated groups 
might have been competing with other groups, as shown by small positive impacts on 
earnings, even with year interaction. Moreover, this might be evidence that the labor 
market is now demanding higher levels of skill and education from workers, generating 
greater negative impacts of shares on earnings for groups with higher levels of education. 
Another way to view the implications of the estimates of the own-effects model 
(as well as own-effects interacted with year indicators) is to consider how the changing 
national distribution of males by age-education group from 1970 to 2000 affects 
predicted earnings within the group (Figures 5.18 and 5.19). In order to accomplish this 
exercise, national proportions of males by age-education group and Census year (Table 
5.1) were used to forecast earnings, applying the coefficients from Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
The figures show that groups with declining proportions experience gains in earnings, 
and vice-versa for groups whose representation is growing. 
Figure 5.18. Ratios of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) to Predicted Earnings from 
Table 5.2, using the National Age-Education Distribution, 1970–2000. 
Men 15–24 Men 25–34 
Men 35–49 Men 50–64 
Note: The scale in the vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison purposes. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Figure 5.19. Ratios of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) to Predicted Earnings from 
Table 5.2, using the National Age-Education Distribution, 1970–2000. 
Men 15–24 Men 25–34 
Men 35–49 Men 50–64 
Note: The scale in the vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison purposes. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
The graphs plot the ratio of predicted earnings from the own-effects model (Table 
5.3, Figure 5.18), and from the own-effects model interacted with year (Table 5.4, Figure 
5.19), to predicted earnings from the model that includes only indicators for age-
education groups and years (Table 5.2). Figures 5.18 and 5.19 illustrate the curves for all 
three education groups within each age group. The horizontal line shows baseline 
predicted values from the model that includes only age-education and year indicators, i.e., 
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the model that excludes the proportions in each age-education group (Table 5.2) is set to 
be equal to one. Comparing the curves in Figures 5.18 and 5.19 to the baseline 
predictions, one can see that the low-education group (zero to four years of schooling) 
has predicted earnings from the own-effects models (and own-effects interacted with 
year) that are increasing over time. These changes make it absolutely clear that it is 
insufficient to look simply at changes in relative earnings; rather, the effects of changes 
in the size of each group on its earnings help make the prediction of earnings changes 
more accurate. 
A substantial difference in trends between Figures 5.18 and 5.19 is for the oldest 
age group with at least nine years of schooling. In Figure 5.18, this group experienced 
gains in earnings even with an increase on its proportion from 1.7 percent in 1991 to 2.8 
percent in 2000 (Table 5.1). This happened because the negative impact of the own-share 
(-0.25 in Table 5.3) is too small to offset the direct impact of age and education (2.24 in 
Table 5.3) on earnings. In Figure 5.19, the negative impact of the own-share (-15.98 in 
Table 5.4) has to be added to the year interactions (1.58 for 1980; 17.85 for 1991; and 
19.39 for 2000 in Table 5.4). Even with greater negative impacts in 1970 and 1980 
compared to 1991 and 2000, the increase in the proportion of this group over time (0.6 
percent in 1970; 1.1 percent in 1980; 1.7 percent in 1991; and 2.8 percent in 2000 in 
Table 5.1) was strong enough to offset the direct impact of age and education (2.23 in 
Table 5.4) on earnings. These changes generated a downward curve between 1970 and 
1991, and a constant trend from 1991 to 2000. 
Moreover, the youngest group with five to eight years of schooling presented an 
increase in earnings from 1991 to 2000 in Figure 5.18, and from 1980 to 2000 in Figure 
5.19, even with an increase from 10.5 percent in 1980 to 12.5 in 2000 (Table 5.1). This 
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result shows that the small increase in the share of this young group during the period 
was insufficient in offsetting the direct gains on earnings provided by education. 
For each of the 12 selected micro-regions (the same as those examined in Figures 
5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16), Figures 5.20 and 5.21 address the ratio between predicted 
mean earnings from the simple model (Equation (1)) that restricted own-quantity effects 
to not vary over time (Table 5.3), and the predicted earnings from the baseline regression 
that only includes the age-education-group and year indicators (Table 5.2). This figure is 
designed to show the differences in estimated earnings between a model that takes into 
account age and education structures (proportions of people by age-education groups) 
and a model of that considers only the direct impact of age and education on earnings. A 
second set of ratios in Figures 5.20 and 5.21 compares predicted earnings from the model 
that includes own-quantity effects that vary over time directly (Equation (1’), Table 5.4), 
and the baseline model that only incorporates the age-education-group and year 
indicators (Table 5.2). The dashed line indicates the ratio between observed and predicted 
earnings from the model that only includes age-education indicators; it demonstrates how 
well the predictions fit the data in the selected areas. The baseline consists of predicted 
values from the model that includes only age-education indicators (Table 5.2), and they 
equal to one for comparison reasons. Ratios presented for 1970 to 2000 in Figures 5.20 
and 5.21 are for males ages 35–49 between five and eight years of schooling. 
The curves in Figures 5.20 and 5.21 demonstrate that the slopes of predicted 
earnings from Equations (1) and (1’) accord fairly well with the slopes actually found in 
the data, all in relation to predicted earnings based on a model without group-size effects. 
Note, however, that the curves are flatter in the Northeastern areas (Figure 5.20) than in 
the areas from the Southeast, South and Center-West (Figure 5.21), due to the greater 
shift in the proportions in this group found in the latter areas. The calculations presented 
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in these figures show that the observed variations over time have patterns that are more 
similar to those in predicted earnings from the Equation (1’), than from the more 
restrictive model that excludes interaction with time (Equation (1)). 
 
Figure 5.20. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Northeast). 
Baixo Parnaíba & Litoral Piauiense - Piauí 
Northeast 
 
Garanhuns - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
 
Cariri - Ceará 
Northeast 
 
Mata Setentrional - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
 
Campina Grande - Paraíba 
Northeast 
 
Ilhéus-Itabuna - Bahia 
Northeast 
 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.21. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Southeast, South, Center-West). 
Uberlândia - Minas Gerais 
Southeast 
 
Maringá - Paraná 
South 
 
Volta Redonda - Rio de Janeiro 
Southeast 
 
Porto Alegre - Rio Grande do Sul 
South 
 
São José do Rio Preto - São Paulo 
Southeast 
 
Anápolis - Goiás 
Center-West 
 




Table 5.6 presents estimates of Equation (2) that includes cross-quantity effects. 
The number of coefficients (147 in total) is daunting and makes it hard to interpret the 
results. In order to understand the estimates, Figures 5.22 and 5.23 can be analyzed by 
comparing estimates of Equations (1) and (2), such as it was done above for Equations 
(1) and (1’). 
More than illustrating the ratio between observed and predicted earnings from the 
model that only includes age-education indicators, as well as the baseline predicted 
values, Figures 5.22 and 5.23 demonstrate two sets of ratios: (1) the ratio of predicted 
earnings from the own-effects model (Equation (1), Table 5.3), that restricted cross-
quantity effects to be zero, to predicted earnings from the baseline regression that only 
involves age-education-group and year indicators; (2) the ratio of predicted earnings from 
the model that includes cross-effects (Equation (2), Table 5.6) to predicted earnings from 
the baseline model that only encompasses age-education-group and year indicators. 
Ratios presented in Figures 5.22 and 5.23 show that the observed variations over 
time have patterns that are more similar to those in predicted earnings from the cross-
effects model than from the more restrictive model that excludes them. This finding is 
clearest for the micro-regions in the Southeastern, Southern, and Center-Western regions 
(Figure 5.23); but additional calculations for all regions suggest that this result is general, 
and thus that cross-effects are important. 
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Table 5.6. Fixed-Effects Estimates of Equation (2), 1970–2000. Dependent Variable is 
log(Monthly Earnings)+. 
Variables Coefficients 
Constant 4.26***    
     
1970 ––    
1980 0.50***    
1991 0.05***    
2000 0.02    
     
Age-education Indicators     
15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling ––    
15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling -1.11***    
15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling -1.82***    
25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling 2.47***    
25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling 0.89    
25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling 3.02***    
35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling 2.90***    
35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling 3.20**    
35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling 5.94***    
50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling 0.08    
50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling 9.71**    
50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling -3.35    
     
Effects of Proportions of Men in the 
Following Age-Education Groups 
on Groups in Columns: 
G11 G12 G13 G21 G22 G23 G31 G32 G33 G41 G42 G43 
15–24 years; 0–4 years of schooling (G11) –– 2.81*** 4.66*** -2.45*** 0.72 -0.31 -2.63*** -1.16 -2.43* 0.15 -7.67** 7.75** 
15–24 years; 5–8 years of schooling (G12) 1.64*** –– 1.63* 0.38 -0.16 -2.51** 0.13 -1.48 -3.71** 3.22*** -8.65** 7.16** 
15–24 years; 9+ years of schooling (G13) 0.91* 0.68 –– -0.68 1.51* -1.27 -0.55 -0.52 -2.69* 2.87*** -5.67* 5.27* 
25–34 years; 0–4 years of schooling (G21) 2.31*** 2.79*** 2.37*** –– 1.42 -1.25 -1.07* -1.73 -3.35** 1.54*** -9.29** 4.03 
25–34 years; 5–8 years of schooling (G22) 2.47*** 7.26*** 5.45*** -0.95 –– -1.81* -0.08 -2.11 -1.81 1.92** -9.43** 4.82 
25–34 years; 9+ years of schooling (G23) -3.02*** -0.51 4.53*** -3.04*** -1.81 –– -2.42** -1.44 -4.98** -1.02 -7.30* 5.51* 
35–49 years; 0–4 years of schooling (G31) 0.82* 1.77*** 4.70*** -0.46 2.50** 2.31** –– 1.94 -2.21 2.93*** -3.90 7.14** 
35–49 years; 5–8 years of schooling (G32) 4.60*** 3.95*** 6.21*** 1.47 4.37** 1.56 0.15 –– -3.72* 3.07** -8.64* 9.34*** 
35–49 years; 9+ years of schooling (G33) 3.84*** 6.06*** 5.95*** -0.33 3.07* 0.58 -0.19 -0.55 –– 3.50** -5.25 12.53*** 
50–64 years; 0–4 years of schooling (G41) 0.23 2.61*** 2.23*** -2.50*** 0.03 -2.65** -2.89*** -2.39* -3.78** –– -7.44** 6.51** 
50–64 years; 5–8 years of schooling (G42) -8.90*** -0.67 -1.50 -11.23*** -7.52** 1.47 -10.95*** -7.67** -4.29 -2.25 –– 3.33 
50–64 years; 9+ years of schooling (G43) 0.73 -1.39 2.75 -0.54 -0.81 0.75 -4.39* -3.57 -3.16 -2.06 -17.79*** –– 
     
N observations 19,727    
N groups 502    
Rho: Fraction of variance due to the υi 0.68    
F (146; 19,079): All coefficients=0 1,808.52***    
F (501; 19,079): Area fixed effects=0 20.82***    
* Significant at p<.05; ** Significant at p<.01; *** Significant at p<.001. 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
Figure 5.22. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Northeast). 
Baixo Parnaíba & Litoral Piauiense - Piauí 
Northeast 
 
Garanhuns - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
 
Cariri - Ceará 
Northeast 
 
Mata Setentrional - Pernambuco 
Northeast 
 
Campina Grande - Paraíba 
Northeast 
 
Ilhéus-Itabuna - Bahia 
Northeast 
 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.23. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Southeast, South, Center-West). 
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Estimates of the coefficients in Equation (2’) are not presented in tabular format 
because the excessive number of coefficients (543 in total) makes it too complicated to 
interpret the results. An interpretation of estimates of Equation (2’) can be done in 
comparison to estimates of Equation (1’) in Figures 5.24 and 5.25, such as was done in 
previous figures. 
In general, as before, observed variations in earnings over time have patterns that 
are more similar to those predicted from the cross-effects model interacted with time 
(Equation (2’)) than those from the more restrictive own-effect model, also including 
interactions with time (Equation (1’)). The predicted values better fit the observed values 
for the Southeastern, Southern and Center-Western regions (Figure 5.25), as observed 
above. 
The same set of ratios of Equation (2’) can be compared with those originating 
from estimates of Equation (2) in Figures 5.26 and 5.27. The inclusion of interactions 
between Censuses year and cross-effects generated predicted earnings that better fit the 
observed data. 
However, it is noticeable that the predicted earnings of all these models have a 
more similar pattern to the observed variations in the Southeastern, Southern and Center-
Western regions, which experienced greater demographic and educational transitions 
compared to the Northeastern regions. A way to control for this variation, and get 
predicted earnings that better fit the observed values, would be through the inclusion of 
interactions between region indicators (North, Northeast, Southeast, South and Center-
West) and the aforementioned proportions: β1 (own-effects), β2 (cross-effects), β3 
(interactions of own-effects with time indicators), and β4 (interactions of cross-effects 
with time indicators). 
 
Figure 5.24. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.25. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Southeast, South, Center-West). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.26. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.27. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), to Predicted Earnings from Table 
5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected 
Micro-regions (Southeast, South, Center-West). 
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THE INFLUENCE OF BRAZILIAN MAJOR REGIONS 
Equations (1), (1’), (2) and (2’) were re-estimated including interactions of the 
quantity terms with five region indicators: North, Northeast, Southeast, South and Center-
West (one is taken as reference). The number of coefficients in these new equations is 
very large. The new estimates generate a total of 67 coefficients in Equation (1) after the 
addition of interactions with region indicators; 211 in Equation (1’) including the new 
interactions; 547 in Equation (2); and 2,131 in Equation (2’). Because of the difficulty of 
interpreting them, the estimates will be shown in graphical format only, and not in tabular 
format. 
Figures 5.28 and 5.29 illustrate: (1) the ratio between observed and predicted 
earnings from the model that only includes age-education indicators; (2) the baseline 
predicted values from the model that only includes age-education indicators (Table 5.2); 
(3) the ratio of predicted earnings from the own-effects model (Equation (1), Table 5.3) 
to the predicted earnings from the baseline regression; (2) the ratio of predicted earnings 
from the model that includes own-effects interacted with region indicators to predicted 
earnings from the baseline. Estimates of the model incorporating interactions with region 
indicators show a slightly better fit to the observed variations than estimates of Equation 
(1). 
Figures 5.30 and 5.31 demonstrate interesting results for ratios of Equation (1’) 
(Table 5.4) and Equation (1’) including interactions with region indicators. The new 
estimates show that predicted earnings from the model that includes own-effects 
interacted with year and region indicators, have patterns that follow much more closely 
with the ones of observed earnings. The improvement in prediction is clear for the 
Northeastern areas (Figure 5.30), in which predicted values now have more similar 
patterns to those in observed earnings at the beginning of the period (1970). 
 
Figure 5.28. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) Including Interactions With Region 
Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–
8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
Figure 5.29. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) Including Interactions With Region 
Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–
8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Southeast, 
South, Center-West). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.30. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) Including Interactions With 
Region Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.31. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) Including Interactions With 
Region Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Southeast, South, Center-West). 
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Figures 5.32 and 5.33 illustrate: (1) ratios of predicted earnings from the cross-
effects model (Equation (2), Table 5.6) to the predicted earnings from the model that 
includes only age-education and year indicators; (2) ratios of predicted earnings from the 
model that includes cross-effects interacted with region indicators to predicted earnings 
from the baseline model; (3) ratios of observed earnings to the baseline model; and (4) 
the baseline for comparison reasons. The new estimates of the model including 
interactions with region indicators do not improve significantly the fit to the observed 
variations when comparing to estimates of Equation (2). The fit observed by the new 
estimates of own-effects interacted with year and region indicators in Figures 5.30 and 
5.31 indicate that a better fit might be observed if cross-quantity terms are allowed to 
vary both over regions and time. 
Figures 5.34 and 5.35 show ratios of estimates from Equation (2’) and Equation 
(2’) including interaction with region indicators to estimates from the baseline model. 
The interesting result is that micro-regions located in the Northeast region, which has 
been experiencing slower demographic and educational transitions compared to the 
Southeastern and Southern regions, have predicted earnings that better fit the data from 
the model that only includes own-effects interacted with region (Figure 5.30) than from 
the model that has cross-effects interacted with region (Figure 5.34). This is in line with 
previous studies that estimated small cross-elasticities of complementarity, meaning that 
exogenous changes in the demographic structure of the labor force do not have large 
effects on the relative wages of other groups (Hamermesh 1993, chapter 3). Even with 
statistically significant cross-effects observed in Equations (2) and (2’), it seems that 
these effects do not have a great impact on earnings, generating predictions that do not 
better fit the data in comparison to those of own-effects models. 
 
Figure 5.32. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2) Including Interactions With Region 
Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–
8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.33. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2) Including Interactions With Region 
Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 5–
8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Southeast, 
South, Center-West). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.34. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’) Including Interactions With 
Region Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.35. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’) Including Interactions With 
Region Indicators, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Southeast, South, Center-West). 
Uberlândia - Minas Gerais 
Southeast 
 
Maringá - Paraná 
South 
 
Volta Redonda - Rio de Janeiro 
Southeast 
 
Porto Alegre - Rio Grande do Sul 
South 
 
São José do Rio Preto - São Paulo 
Southeast 
 
Anápolis - Goiás 
Center-West 
 




THE ISSUE OF MICRO-REGION SIZE 
As a strategy to take into account the influence of different population sizes of 
micro-regions in the prediction of earnings, indicators for size of micro-regions were 
included in the models, in the same way that region indicators were included above. 
Micro-regions were divided into four groups defined by the quartile distribution of the 
male population receiving earnings for each year, as specified in Chapter 3. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate the variation in the male population size across the 
micro-regions by year and age-education group. Information on the quartiles (25-percent, 
50-percent, 75-percent), 10th percentile, 90th percentile, as well as the smallest and 
largest size of the male population in micro-regions are included in the tables. Only un-
weighted cells with at least 25 men in the micro-region by year and age-education group 
were included in the calculations to generate these tables, in order to have the same 
criteria used in the regression models. 
For age groups 15–24 and 25–34 (Table 5.7), and groups 35–49 and 50–64 (Table 
5.8), the statistics for the lowest-education group have been decreasing over time, 
indicating that this group is becoming scarce in the population. On the other hand, groups 
with higher education (five to eight years of schooling, and at least nine years of 
schooling) have an increasing trend in the statistics over time. Even with smaller samples 
in 1991 and 2000, the number of observations in the better educated groups is bigger than 
in 1970 and 1980. 
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Table 5.7. Variation in Male Population Size Across the Micro-Regions by Year and 
Age-Education Group, Ages 15–34, 1970–2000+. 
 1970 1980 1991 2000 
Age-education 













































































































































































































































+ Only un-weighted cells with at least 25 men in the micro-region by year and age-education group were included in these calculations. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 5.8. Variation in Male Population Size Across the Micro-Regions by Year and 
Age-Education Group, Ages 35–64, 1970–2000+. 
 1970 1980 1991 2000 
Age-education 













































































































































































































































+ Only un-weighted cells with at least 25 men in the micro-region by year and age-education group were included in these calculations. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
 
Results of estimates in Equations (1), (1’), (2) and (2’), including interactions of 
proportions of males in age-education groups with indicators of population size of micro-
regions, are illustrated in Figures 5.36 to 5.43. Tabular format of these new estimates are 
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not shown, because of the large amount of coefficients generated. As anticipated, results 
suggest that the bigger the micro-region, the greater the earnings. However, the new 
estimates suggest that predicted earnings do not change significantly from original 
Equations (1), (1’), (2) and (2’) after the inclusion of interactions with micro-region size. 
This finding might be a sign that original estimates presented above fit the observed data 
well, even not controlling for population size of micro-regions. These re-estimates 
indicate that the functions are not heterothetic, thus different population sizes of micro-
regions do not alter the impact of the age-education-group proportions on earnings. This 
result is in agreement with the assumption of homotheticity. 
Figure 5.36. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) Including Interactions With Micro-
region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 
5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Northeast). 
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Cariri - Ceará 
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Ilhéus-Itabuna - Bahia 
Northeast 
 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
 114
Figure 5.37. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) Including Interactions With Micro-
region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 
5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Southeast, 
South, Center-West). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.38. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) Including Interactions With 
Micro-region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.39. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) Including Interactions With 
Micro-region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Southeast, South, Center-West). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.40. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2) Including Interactions With Micro-
region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 
5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.41. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2) Including Interactions With Micro-
region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 with 
5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions (Southeast, 
South, Center-West). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.42. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’) Including Interactions With 
Micro-region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Northeast). 
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Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses.  
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Figure 5.43. Ratios of Observed Earnings, of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’), and 
of Predicted Earnings from Equation (2’) Including Interactions With 
Micro-region Size, to Predicted Earnings from Table 5.2, Males Ages 35–49 
with 5–8 Years of Education, 1970–2000, Selected Micro-regions 
(Southeast, South, Center-West). 
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SUMMARY OF MODELS 
The general conclusion from the findings presented above is that the inclusion of 
interactions of age-education group proportions with five indicators of major regions, as 
well as with four indicators of population size of micro-regions do not alter the original 
Equations (1), (1’), (2) and (2’). The estimated own-quantity elasticities are negative, and 
in general they are more negative as the skill embodied in the group of workers increases. 
The impact of proportions on earnings is changing over time, with a decrease in the 
negative elasticities for the least-educated groups, indicating that the small proportional 
size of these groups do not have a significant impact on earnings in more recent years. 
For better educated groups, the negative impact has been increasing over time with slight 
variations in more recent years. Finally, Table 5.9 illustrates the F-statistics that test 
whether all coefficients are equal to zero, and whether the area fixed effects are equal to 
zero for the models discussed above. The fraction of the variance due to the area fixed 
effects (υi) –– Rho –– is included in the table. 
As explained above, the maximum number of possible observations in the 
regression is 24,096, because there are 502 micro-regions, 12 age-education groups and 
four Censuses. Because of the requirement that the cells should have at least 25 men 
receiving earnings, there were 19,727 observations throughout the models. In general, the 
statistics in Table 5.9 indicate that for models with fewer variables, and consequently 
with fewer coefficients to be estimated, the F-statistics are larger. All models presented 
significant estimates, suggesting that the null hypothesis is not true. For the model with 
the highest amount of independent variables (2,630), including cross-proportions 
interacted with year and five major-region indicators; the fraction of variance due to the 
area fixed effects was 0.98. 
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Table 5.9. Summary of F-Statistics from the Model Only With Age-Education-Group and 
Year Indicators, from Equations (1), (1’), (2), (2’), and from Models 
Including Interactions With Micro-region Size and Region Indicators. 
Models All Coefficients=0 Area Fixed Effects=0 (F-Test that All υi=0) 
Rho: Fraction of 
Variance Due to the υi
Model only with year and 
age-education indicators 
F (14; 19,211): 
12,941.99*** 




F (26; 19,199): 
8,506.08*** 
F (501; 19,199): 
57.02*** 0.73 
Equation (1’): 
Own-effects X Year 
F (62; 19,163): 
3,957.16*** 




F (146; 19,079): 
1,808.52*** 
F (501; 19,079): 
20.82*** 0.68 
Equation (2’): 





















































* Significant at p<.05; ** Significant at p<.01; *** Significant at p<.001. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Chapter 6. Potential problems on estimated own-quantity elasticities 
INTERNAL MIGRATION IN BRAZIL 
Because the models were estimated at the local level, it would have been 
important to account for internal migration in the equations. Previous studies about the 
influence of changing age distribution on economic development did not incorporate the 
migration variable, because the analysis was done at the national level. Internal migration 
in Brazil is an important demographic component, since significant population streams 
from rural to urban areas occurred in previous decades. This migration is characterized by 
streams from areas of higher fertility rates to those of lower fertility. In other words, 
internal migration might reduce the differential in birth rates between rural and urban 
areas. However, this process might also increase the difference in dependency ratios, 
since migrants are concentrated within working ages. These specificities indicate that 
models would have to take into account the migration variable, in order to surmise the 
influence of age structure on economic development. 
Caetano (2003) summarizes all migration variables that are available in the 1960–
2000 Brazilian Censuses. He provides a chart including all questions on population flows, 
attempting to make the variables comparable across the years when they are available in 
more than one Census. This is the summary of migration variables in Brazilian Censuses 
provided by Caetano: (1) state or country of birth was obtained in all Censuses; (2) 
nationality is also available in all Censuses; (3) 1991 and 2000 Censuses provide the year 
in which foreigners moved to Brazil; (4) 1970–2000 Censuses have information on 
whether the person was born in the municipality of residence; (5) in the 2000 Census, 
there is information on whether the person lives in the municipality of residence since 
birth; (6) 1980 and 1991 Censuses identify if respondent lived in rural and/or urban areas 
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in the municipality of residence; (7) in 1991, if the person lived in both rural and urban 
areas in the municipality, he/she also relays the amount of years of the last movement; (8) 
all Censuses have information on number of years that the respondent lives in the 
municipality; (9) 1960–2000 Censuses have information of state or country of previous 
residence; (10) only 1980 and 1991 Censuses also have information on the municipality 
of previous residence if the person lived less than ten years in the municipality; (11) the 
2000 Census indicates whether the respondent was born in the state of residence; (12) 
information on the amount of years of continuous residence in the state is available for 
1970–2000 Censuses; (13) all Censuses asked respondent whether he/she lived in rural or 
urban area in the municipality of previous residence; (14) in the 2000 Census, there is 
information on whether the person lived in this/other municipality, as well as in 
urban/rural area in July 31, 1995 (five years before the Census); (15) 1991 and 2000 
Censuses asked in which municipality and state (or country) the person lived exactly five 
years before the Census; (16) in 1991 Census, there is specification of the type of area 
(urban or rural) of the residence five years before the Census (in September 1, 1986); (17) 
finally, the 2000 Census has information on which municipality and state (or country) the 
person works or studies. 
In a specific study by Greenwood and Sweetland (1972), the determinants of 
migration between standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA) in the United States 
are analyzed. The gross inter-SMSA migration is explained without any explicit 
information of an individual decision function. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
number of migrants who moved from a SMSAi in 1955 to a SMSAj in 1960, by the 
estimated population of SMSAj in 1955. The independent variables include aggregate 
proxy variables that reflect factors that are likely to effect the decision to migrate. Some 
of these explanatory variables are: distances between areas, male median income in an 
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area, ratios of per capita local government expenditures among different areas, and 
population at the beginning of the period. This study provides a way to analyze migration 
rates constructing variables from different sources. 
Greenwood et al (1991) develop models to measure the impact of regional 
unemployment rate and relative expected income (RY) on actual labor force participation 
rates using 1970 and 1980 American Censuses. Models are determined by states, and 
variables are collected from different sources. Fixed-effects models are estimated because 
individual effects are associated with each area. Since the relative expected income is 
endogenous, instrumental variables are used to correct estimates. Because the model is 
calculated at the state level, authors take into account internal migration, defining 
economic flows as the difference between actual civilian population under age 65 and 
estimated civilian population under age 65 in the absence of migration. In order to 
understand the model estimates, Greenwood et al clarify that: 
(...) an equilibrium value of RY of less than unity implies area characteristics that 
are attractive to individuals such that they are willing to accept lower earnings of 
pay higher local prices, or both, in order to ‘consume’ the area’s characteristics. 
Areas with equilibrium RY’s that exceed unity have less attractive characteristics, 
and therefore individuals require a premium in earnings or lower local prices, or 
both, to be in equilibrium (Greenwood et al 1991, p.1385). 
Because Greenwood et al’s (1991) model deals with fixed-effects estimates using 
Census data, this study could be adapted to the Brazilian models presented in previous 
sections. However, an initial problem would be to collect the necessary information to 
estimate those models at the micro-region level. 
Some other papers deal more with age composition of migrants, but might be 
relevant to this study. Greenwood et al (1999) gets information from sending-countries to 
build models that explain rates of U.S. immigration. They use several variables related to 
differential economic opportunities, migration costs (including distance), political 
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conditions, U.S. immigration policy, social programs in the sending-countries, and total 
population in the sending-countries. The Hausman-Taylor approach, including 
instrumental variables, is used, because it takes into account factors that differ across 
countries but are temporally invariant, such as distance from the sending-countries to the 
United States. Greenwood et al (2003) also estimate Hausman-Taylor models to calculate 
the impact of social programs in source countries in the age composition of legal U.S. 
immigrants. Finally, Greenwood (2007) makes use of Hausman-Taylor models with 
instrumental variables to analyze the age composition of immigrants to the United States 
using annual data (1972–1991) from 109 source countries. 
In the case of Brazil, a study of the composition of migrants with Census data can 
be done. Basically, the idea is to apply the same models presented by Greenwood and 
colleagues about the composition of migrants in the United States to the Brazilian 
context. The model would determine the rate of migration among all micro-regions for 
each one of the 12 age-education groups discussed in previous sections. This model 
would take into account age-specific emigration rates, as well as the age composition of 
these flows. Censuses would be used to organize a data set containing information on: (1) 
census year; (2) sending state (i); (3) destination state (j); (4) stock of people in the 
sending area (i) for the 12 age-education groups for males, and the 12 age-education 
groups for females; (5) stock of people in each age-education-sex group in the destination 
state (j); (6) stock of males and females in each age-education group in the destination 
area (j) who were born in the respective sending state (i); (7) stock of people in each age-
education-sex group in the destination area (j) that were born in the destination area (j); 
(8) inter-state migrants in the last five years in each age-education-sex group, using 
information of state of previous residence (variable can also be constructed for the last 
ten years); (9) earnings for each sex in each age-education group in the sending-state (i); 
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(10) earnings for each age-education-sex group in the destination state (j); (11) percent of 
people in each age-education group employed in specific occupation sectors (such as 
agriculture) in the sending-state (i). 
Since the 1960 Census does not have information for all states, and the model 
proposed by Greenwood and colleagues has to be balanced, the data set could be 
prepared from 1960 to 2000, only for states also included in 1960; or for the whole 
country only for Censuses from 1970 to 2000. Moreover, different periods of migration 
could be also estimated in this kind of analysis. Such as detailed above, migration was 
considered for flows that took place during the five years before each Census, but 
migrants in the period of five to ten years before each Census could also be included in 
the data set. 
This approach would provide an informative sign of the magnitude of migration, 
through the number of recent migrants in each of the age-education-sex groups, as well as 
the changing proportions of people born out of state in the group. Such as detailed above, 
this approach is estimated to in-migration, rather than out- migration. 
Another way to include population flows in the models is through the estimation 
of net migration. One difficulty is that it would be hard to estimate net migration of the 
youngest age-education groups by way of survival from the previous Census. However, 
even with this limitation of Census information on migration, Rogers and Jordan (2004) 
develop and demonstrate a method that uses the population totals in the first age group of 
birthplace-specific population data to indirectly infer the entire age schedule of 
directional age-specific migration flows. They focus the analysis on the internal 
migration of the U.S.-born population. Rogers and Jordan suggest the use of the 
“multiexponential function,” estimating parameters with a nonlinear algorithm that 
searches for the best parameter values for the model migration schedule. This technique 
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of birthplace-specific population stocks of infants could be used to generate more 
accurate age-specific migration rates for all 502 Brazilian micro-regions. 
Such as discussed in previous sections, Borjas (2003) suggests that studies about 
the impact of immigration on labor market were mainly based on the comparison of 
employment opportunities between immigrants and natives across regions. The main 
conclusion was usually that immigrants do not lower native wages. Using a new approach 
based on the assumption that similarly educated workers with different levels of 
experience are not perfect substitutes, Borjas suggests that immigration reduces the wage 
and labor supply of competing native workers. However, since internal population flows 
in Brazil are influenced by availability of jobs and levels of income in sending and 
receiving areas, migration is an endogenous variable that could not be simply introduced 
as an exogenous variable in the estimation of labor outcomes. 
In general, the studies above illustrate some possibilities to the estimation and 
implementation of migration information on regression models. The use of aggregate 
proxy variables from different sources would minimize the dependence of migration 
estimation on Census data. The use of instrumental variables could be a strategy to 
control for endogeneity of the estimated age-specific migration rates. The study of age-
education composition of migrants could be a tool to correct the models shown in 
previous sections. 
Finally, gravity models, taking into account distances among areas, could also be 
used to control for migration flows. More than distance, these gravity models could take 
into account the changing population in the micro-regions over time, as well as the 
proportion of migrants already living in a specific area in a given Census. The idea is to 
use distance among micro-regions, population growth, and income trend over time to 
create an index to be used as an instrumental variable in the equations. Distance is 
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constant over time, but the micro-regions population growth changes their out- and in-
migration trends. Micro-regions that have a growing mean income trend over time are 
more susceptible to attracting migrants. More specifically, Brazilian Census Bureau 
shapefiles would generate a matrix with distances among all micro-regions. The weighted 
number of men in the micro-regions, available in the databases, could be used to generate 
a population growth measure over time. Finally, the logarithm of mean earnings in each 
micro-region and year would be used to generate the income trend over time. Thus the 
combination of distance, population growth and mean income trend over time can be 
used to generate attraction and repulsion measures of population flows among micro-
regions. 
However, these model alternatives are not estimated at this point, because they 
would create a whole new research project. An analysis of how ignoring migration biases 
the own-quantity elasticities is done in the following section. 
 
ROBUSTNESS CONSIDERATIONS 
Remembering that the purpose has been to examine the impacts of changing 
endowments of labor by type (in this case, age and education), one needs to inquire 
whether the strong evidence uncovered here, that there are substantial negative own-
quantity elasticities of factor prices, is robust to a number of potential problems. Consider 
first the issue of inter-micro-regional migration. Ideally one might embed the production 
models estimated here in a more general model in which population is determined 
endogenously with wages through endogenous flows of migrants. However, new models 
were not estimated, due to the difficulty in calculating instruments, such as discussed 
above. These instruments might have been used to remove any problems of endogeneity 
in the age-education distributions, that are used here as regressors. 
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Not taking into account any instruments, it is important to consider the direction 
of the bias in the estimated own-quantity elasticities that might be induced by 
endogenous inter-area migration. Such migration presumably flows to those areas where 
relative declines in the size of the labor force in a particular age-education category have 
raised wage rates. If so, migration flows reduce wage rates in precisely those areas and 
among those age-education groups where natural (pre-migration) scarcities would have 
raised wages. Endogenous migration thus biases the estimated negative own-quantity 
effects on wages toward zero and thus implies, assuming migrants respond to relative 
wage differentials, that above estimates understate the absolute value of the effects that 
have been tried to be measured. 
Whether the biases induced by endogenous migration differ by age-education 
category is a more difficult question and depends largely on differences in the 
responsiveness of migration to wage differentials by age-education category. Certainly it 
is known that in Brazil, as elsewhere, migration is disproportionate among younger 
workers; and there is also evidence that Brazilian migration is greatest among the least-
educated. There is little known, however, about differences in the responsiveness of 
migration to wages by age-education group. If, however, the elasticities of migration with 
respect to wages are, like labor-supply elasticities, greater for less-skilled workers, that 
would suggest that the positive biases on the own-quantity factor-price elasticities are 
greater for less-skilled workers –– in this study, the young and the least-educated. 
A similar problem might arise if educational attainment is endogenous –– if 
within micro-regions young people attain more schooling when the returns to education 
have increased because more educated labor has become relatively scarce. If this occurs, 
the response would raise quantity endowments and reduce relative wages among those 
labor-force groups whose relative wage rates would otherwise have risen still further. 
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Like the biases in own-quantity factor-price elasticities potentially induced by 
endogenous migration, those potentially induced by endogenous educational choices also 
reduce the absolute values of the (negative) estimated parameters below their true values. 
Other potential difficulties might arise from the implicit assumption that the sub-
aggregates of male labor are separable in production from those of other inputs, including 
capital and female labor. In the broad labor-demand literature formal tests of separability 
almost always reject that assumption (Hamermesh 1993, chapter 3). Without data on 
capital stocks by area, it is not possible to re-specify the model to account for this non-
separability problem. The literature suggests quite clearly, however, that capital and skill 
are p-complements, so that it is expected the returns to skill will be greater in those areas 
where production is more physical-capital intensive. Coupled with a probable positive 
correlation between skill intensity and endowments of physical capital, this correlation 
means that any misspecification resulting from the absence of data on physical capital 
will bias the estimated own-quantity factor-price elasticities among more skilled workers 
toward zero. 
The same Census information by micro-region on the age-education structure of 
the female workforce is available as it is for males. It would be possible thus to include 
these distributions as additional Xc’ variables in estimating (2), thus allowing for cross-
effects of relative quantities of female workers on male relative wages. The difficulties 
with doing this are several. Most importantly, the distributions of female workers are 
highly correlated with those of male workers. Where and when the male workforce is 
older, so is the female workforce; where and when men are better educated, so are 
women. How excluding quantities of female workers from the equations biases the 
estimated own-quantity factor-price elasticities for male workers depends on both this 
positive correlation and the substitution/complementarity relationships between male and 
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female workers within and across age-education categories. There is no evidence on these 
latter correlations, so that in the end the direction of any bias is an empirical issue. 
However, the endowments of female workers were added to a set of re-estimates of (2); 
not surprisingly, the high positive correlations between the male and female distributions 
across the age-education categories within areas caused the standard errors to increase 
greatly. 
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Chapter 7. Implications for public policies 
Some consideration should be given to the implications for public policies 
originating from the analysis in this study. The decomposition of the impact of changes in 
age-education groups on earnings provides insight about the separated impact of age and 
education changes. 
One can hold constant the age structure from the 1970 Census, and use the 
education structure from the 2000 Census to estimate earnings in 2000. Comparing these 
new estimated earnings to the original 2000 predicted earnings (using age and education 
structures from 2000) measures the effect of changing age composition on earnings. For 
example, if age structure had remained the same from 1970 to 2000, one can compare 
these new results to the 2000 original predicted values to verify that groups who 
experienced proportional increases over time (age-groups 25–34, 35–49, and 50–64) had 
smaller original earnings in 2000, compared to the earnings with constant age structure. 
In the opposite case, earnings in 2000 can be predicted utilizing the 1970 education 
structure and the 2000 age structure. These new estimated earnings can be compared to 
the 2000 original predicted earnings to analyze the impact of changing education 
composition on earnings. 
These estimates can be conducted utilizing the same strategies that produced 
Figures 5.18 and 5.19. First of all, national proportions of males by age-education group 
and Census year (Table 5.1) were used to generate two new sets of national proportions: 
(1) holding age composition constant from 1970; and (2) holding education composition 
constant from 1970. In an additional step, these two new standardized compositions were 
used to forecast four sets of earnings: (1) two sets of earnings were generated applying 
the coefficients from the own-effects model (Table 5.3) and are shown in Table 7.1; and 
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(2) two sets of earnings were estimated using the coefficients from the own-effects model 
interacted with year indicators (Table 5.4) and are illustrated in Table 7.2. 
Thus, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show: (1) the 1970 predicted earnings, utilizing the 1970 
actual age-education structure; (2) the 2000 predicted earnings, using the 2000 actual 
age-education distribution; (3) the 2000 predicted earnings, employing the 2000 actual 
education composition, and the 1970 age structure; (4) and the 2000 predicted earnings, 
utilizing the 2000 actual age structure, and the 1970 education composition. 
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Table 7.1. Effects of Age and Education Distributions on Predicted Earnings+ from 
Equation (1) by Age-Education Groups, 1970 and 2000. 
Age-Education 1970 Actual 2000 Predicted Earnings Using: 
Group Predicted Earnings 2000 Actual 
Age-Education 
Distribution 
2000 Actual Education, 
and 1970 Age 
Distribution 




0–4 years of schooling 162.81 202.03 201.81 200.53 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 252.41 243.73 229.60 321.10 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 386.89 329.49 306.83 480.39 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 236.21 300.46 300.81 290.72 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 500.30 435.64 442.69 590.64 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 905.35 796.27 808.72 1,111.79 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 293.24 400.16 406.05 341.30 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 722.59 610.31 638.24 843.60 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,391.23 1,375.81 1,409.14 1,679.37 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 309.80 394.42 399.25 331.58 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 824.87 811.51 830.70 1,005.31 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,556.92 1,891.74 1,892.67 1,901.83 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.2. Effects of Age and Education Distributions on Predicted Earnings+ from 
Equation (1’) by Age-Education Groups, 1970 and 2000. 
Age-Education 1970 Actual 2000 Predicted Earnings Using: 
Group Predicted Earnings 2000 Actual 
Age-Education 
Distribution 
2000 Actual Education, 
and 1970 Age 
Distribution 




0–4 years of schooling 161.01 206.49 204.45 192.58 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 254.35 268.63 245.19 409.39 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 430.20 321.84 299.68 469.45 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 225.60 312.56 314.13 271.04 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 533.62 445.95 454.15 629.99 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,040.79 812.09 815.46 887.72 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 269.80 404.40 414.40 310.07 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 788.13 609.37 642.95 898.28 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,536.64 1,281.75 1,328.73 1,729.86 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 276.26 414.27 424.84 289.37 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 941.57 814.89 825.19 914.27 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,687.24 1,422.78 1,469.16 2,013.55 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Analyzing the results in the third column of Tables 7.1 and 7.2, one can see that 
mean real earnings would have been smaller for the youngest age group (15–24), when 
holding age composition constant, compared to original estimates (second column). 
Predicted earnings are greater for the other age groups compared to original estimates, 
because the aging process experienced by the Brazilian population increased the share of 
these age groups, with a result of even smaller original predicted earnings (second 
column) compared to the case of age composition constant (third column). 
Results from estimates holding education constant from 1970 to 2000 (fourth 
column) indicate that, for groups with greater levels of education (five to eight years of 
schooling, and at least nine years of schooling), earnings of these workers would have 
been larger than the original estimates at the end of the period. This provides evidence 
that the improvement in education attainment over time increased the share of workers 
with better education, lowering their income. Groups in the lowest educated level (zero to 
four years of schooling) would have experienced a decrease in their earnings with a 
constant education structure from 1970 to 2000, compared to original predictions. This 
fact is verified because since the lowest educated groups represented a greater share in 
the 1970 population compared to the 2000 population, their earnings would have fallen 
considerably if they remained a significant portion of the population. 
In general, results in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggest that changes in the education 
distribution are the ones that generated the greatest impacts on earnings over time. When 
holding 1970 education composition constant (fourth column), the predicted earnings 
have values more unlike the original 2000 predicted earnings (second column) than when 
holding age composition constant (third column). Thus, changing education composition 
over time, within labor force ages (15–64), generated greater impacts on worker earnings 
than changes in age structure. 
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Improvements in education attainment generated lower earnings for better 
educated workers compared to the estimates holding education constant from 1970. 
However, an important result is that if the education had maintained constant over time, 
the lowest educated workers would have experienced even smaller earnings than 
illustrated by the original predictions. More specifically, earnings inequality between the 
least educated group (zero to four years of schooling) and the other education groups, 
within each age group, would have been even greater than the one predicted with the age-
education composition in 2000. Thus, the improvement in education attainment from 
1970 to 2000 was an important aspect towards reducing economic inequality in Brazil. 
Moreover, changes in age structure also decreased earnings inequality between 
the youngest age group (15–24) compared to the other age groups. This assessment is 
supported by the finding that mean real earnings would have been smaller for the 
youngest age group, and bigger for the other ones, if the age composition had remained 
the same from 1970 to 2000. Thus, fertility decline had a central role in the reduction of 
income inequality in the country, because it generated a decrease in the proportion of 
younger groups in the labor market. 
Since there is great variation in age and education compositions across Brazilian 
micro-regions, such as illustrated in this study, important policies to decrease even further 
income inequality in the country would be to improve education attainment in areas that 
still have large proportions of people with lower levels of schooling, as well as to 
promote family planning programs in regions that still have higher levels of fertility. 
In order to better understand the separate impact of changing age and education 
compositions over time in the predicted earnings, a set of figures were estimated using 
the same procedures that were used to construct Figures 5.18 and 5.19. The national age-
education proportions, holding age composition constant from 1970 to 2000, and holding 
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education composition constant from 1970 to 2000, were utilized for this exercise, as 
well as coefficients in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
Figures 7.1 to 7.4 plot the ratio of predicted earnings from the own-effects model 
(Table 5.3), and from the own-effects model interacted with year (Table 5.4), to predicted 
earnings from the model that includes only indicators for age-education groups and years 
(Table 5.2). The horizontal line is set to be equal to one, and shows the model that 
excludes the proportions in each age-education group (Table 5.2). As in Figures 5.18 and 
5.19, the new figures demonstrate that groups with decreasing proportions have gains in 
earnings, and those with growing proportions experience a decline in earnings over time. 
Figures 7.1 illustrates estimates from the own-effects model (Equation (1)), 
holding national age distribution constant from 1970 to 2000; Figure 7.2 shows estimates 
from Equation (1), holding national education distribution constant from 1970 to 2000; 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates predictions from own-effects model interacted with year 
indicators (Equation (1’)), holding age distribution constant; and Figure 7.4 shows 
estimates from Equation (1’), holding education distribution constant. The scale in the 
vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison 
purposes. 
Figure 7.1 indicates that, holding age composition constant from 1970 to 2000, 
the ratios of predicted earnings from Equation (1) to the baseline model would be lower 
for the lowest age group (15–24) compared to the results in Figure 5.18. On the other 
hand, older age groups (35–49 and 50–64) have higher ratios than the previous results. 
These patterns show that maintaining a younger age composition constant over time, 
would decrease the earnings of younger males, and increase those of older males. 
The general tendency illustrated in Figure 7.2 is that ratios for the lowest educated 
group (zero to four years of schooling) are smaller compared to the ones in Figure 5.18, 
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and ratios for the groups with higher education are bigger than in the previous results. 
These findings demonstrate that, keeping education distribution constant from 1970 to 
2000, estimates from Equation (1) will have greater negative impacts for the group with 
bigger proportions in 1970 (zero to four years of schooling), than for education groups 
with smaller proportions at the beginning of the period. 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 have to be compared to Figure 5.19, because they illustrate 
results from Equation (1’). Figure 7.1 indicated that holding the younger age composition 
in 1970 constant, it would decrease earnings of younger males, and increase earnings in 
older groups. When interactions of year indicators with age-education group proportions 
are included in the model, the new results in Figure 7.3 suggest that the gains and losses 
in predicted ratios for the several age-education groups have a similar pattern to the 
original estimates (Figure 5.19). Figure 7.4 shows predicted ratios holding education 
distribution constant from 1970 to 2000. In this case, it is clear that for the education 
group (zero to four years of schooling) that had greater proportions in 1970, the new 
predicted earnings are lower compared to the ones in Figure 5.19. On the other hand, 
groups with lower proportions in 1970 (five to eight years of schooling, and at least nine 
years of schooling) have higher predicted ratios than the results in Figure 5.19. 
 
Figure 7.1. Ratios of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) to Predicted Earnings from 
Table 5.2, using the National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining 
the 1970 Age Distribution Constant, 1970–2000. 
Men 15–24 Men 25–34 
Men 35–49 Men 50–64 
Note: The scale in the vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison purposes. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Figure 7.2. Ratios of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1) to Predicted Earnings from 
Table 5.2, using the National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining 
the 1970 Education Distribution Constant, 1970–2000. 
Men 15–24 Men 25–34 
Men 35–49 Men 50–64 
Note: The scale in the vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison purposes. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Figure 7.3. Ratios of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) to Predicted Earnings from 
Table 5.2, using the National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining 
the 1970 Age Distribution Constant, 1970–2000. 
Men 15–24 Men 25–34 
Men 35–49 Men 50–64 
Note: The scale in the vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison purposes. 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Figure 7.4. Ratios of Predicted Earnings from Equation (1’) to Predicted Earnings from 
Table 5.2, using the National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining 
the 1970 Education Distribution Constant, 1970–2000. 
Men 15–24 Men 25–34 
Men 35–49 Men 50–64 
Note: The scale in the vertical axis is the same in Figures 5.18, 5.19, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 for comparison purposes. 




Calculations of Gini coefficients are presented in the following tables in order to 
measure the inequality of the income distribution among age-education groups. The 
income is more equally distributed among groups, when the coefficient is closer to zero. 
When the coefficient is closer to one, the income is more unequally distributed. A 
coefficient equal to zero corresponds to perfect income equality, i.e. everyone has the 
same income. A coefficient equal to one indicates a perfect income inequality, i.e. one 
group has all the income, while everyone else has zero income. 
These coefficients are a more appropriate measure to estimate income inequality 
than the predicted earnings presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. This improvement happens 
because Gini coefficients take into account not only the income distributions presented in 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2, but also the specific national age-education distributions used to 
calculate those predicted earnings. 
More specifically, Gini coefficients that used predicted national earnings from 
Equation (1) in Table 7.1, utilized: (1) in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, national age-education 
distribution in Table 5.1; (2) in Table 7.5, national age-education distribution, holding 
age composition constant from 1970 to 2000; and (3) in Table 7.6, national age-education 
distribution, maintaining education composition constant from 1970 to 2000. 
The estimates from Equation (1’) in Table 7.2 were used to calculate Gini 
coefficients: (1) in Tables 7.7 and 7.8, with national age-education distribution in Table 
5.1; (2) in Table 7.9, using national age-education distribution, maintaining age 
composition constant from 1970 to 2000; and (3) in Table 7.10, utilizing national age-
education composition, holding education distribution constant from 1970 to 2000. 
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Table 7.3. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 162.81 0.022 0.282 0.022 0.282 0.016 0.007 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 252.41 0.033 0.054 0.055 0.336 0.036 0.020 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 386.89 0.051 0.027 0.106 0.363 0.050 0.060 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 236.21 0.031 0.197 0.138 0.560 0.114 0.080 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 500.30 0.066 0.020 0.204 0.580 0.188 0.122 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 905.35 0.120 0.020 0.324 0.600 0.218 0.268 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 293.24 0.039 0.227 0.363 0.827 0.379 0.306 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 722.59 0.096 0.016 0.459 0.843 0.542 0.394 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,391.23 0.184 0.016 0.643 0.859 0.588 0.635 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 309.80 0.041 0.128 0.684 0.987 0.784 0.680 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 824.87 0.109 0.007 0.794 0.994 0.994 0.794 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,556.92 0.206 0.006 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 7,542.62 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.908 3.365 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.542  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.4. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 202.03 0.026 0.090 0.026 0.090 0.005 0.006 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 243.73 0.031 0.125 0.057 0.215 0.021 0.018 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 329.49 0.042 0.102 0.099 0.317 0.044 0.040 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 300.46 0.039 0.088 0.138 0.406 0.079 0.067 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 435.64 0.056 0.076 0.194 0.482 0.143 0.109 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 796.27 0.102 0.081 0.296 0.563 0.196 0.206 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 400.16 0.051 0.133 0.348 0.696 0.296 0.265 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 610.31 0.078 0.067 0.426 0.764 0.460 0.361 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,375.81 0.177 0.085 0.602 0.848 0.554 0.573 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 394.42 0.051 0.104 0.653 0.952 0.721 0.635 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 811.51 0.104 0.020 0.757 0.972 0.972 0.757 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,891.74 0.243 0.028 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 7,791.57 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.490 3.038 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.452  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.5. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 
Equation (1) and National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining the 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 201.81 0.026 0.103 0.026 0.103 0.006 0.006 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 229.60 0.029 0.143 0.055 0.246 0.023 0.020 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 306.83 0.039 0.117 0.094 0.363 0.048 0.042 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 300.81 0.038 0.085 0.132 0.448 0.084 0.069 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 442.69 0.056 0.074 0.188 0.522 0.152 0.113 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 808.72 0.103 0.078 0.291 0.600 0.206 0.210 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 406.05 0.052 0.121 0.343 0.721 0.306 0.268 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 638.24 0.081 0.061 0.424 0.782 0.472 0.364 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,409.14 0.179 0.077 0.603 0.859 0.562 0.576 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 399.25 0.051 0.096 0.654 0.955 0.725 0.637 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 830.70 0.106 0.018 0.759 0.974 0.974 0.759 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,892.67 0.241 0.026 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 7,866.51 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.557 3.064 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.492  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.6. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 
Equation (1) and National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining the 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 200.53 0.022 0.182 0.022 0.182 0.010 0.005 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 321.10 0.035 0.042 0.057 0.223 0.025 0.014 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 480.39 0.053 0.024 0.110 0.247 0.035 0.047 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 290.72 0.032 0.177 0.142 0.424 0.088 0.064 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 590.64 0.065 0.026 0.207 0.450 0.148 0.097 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,111.79 0.122 0.019 0.329 0.469 0.172 0.242 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 341.30 0.038 0.267 0.367 0.736 0.338 0.278 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 843.60 0.093 0.023 0.459 0.759 0.489 0.358 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,679.37 0.185 0.020 0.644 0.779 0.530 0.635 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 331.58 0.036 0.208 0.680 0.987 0.780 0.676 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 1,005.31 0.110 0.007 0.791 0.993 0.993 0.791 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,901.83 0.209 0.007 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 9,098.16 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.609 3.208 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.401  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.7. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 161.01 0.020 0.282 0.020 0.282 0.014 0.007 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 254.35 0.031 0.054 0.051 0.336 0.035 0.019 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 430.20 0.053 0.027 0.104 0.363 0.048 0.058 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 225.60 0.028 0.197 0.132 0.560 0.110 0.076 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 533.62 0.066 0.020 0.197 0.580 0.188 0.118 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,040.79 0.128 0.020 0.325 0.600 0.215 0.269 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 269.80 0.033 0.227 0.358 0.827 0.376 0.302 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 788.13 0.097 0.016 0.455 0.843 0.542 0.391 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,536.64 0.189 0.016 0.643 0.859 0.582 0.635 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 276.26 0.034 0.128 0.677 0.987 0.783 0.673 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 941.57 0.116 0.007 0.793 0.994 0.994 0.793 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,687.24 0.207 0.006 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 8,145.21 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.887 3.340 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.547  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.8. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 206.49 0.028 0.090 0.028 0.090 0.006 0.006 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 268.63 0.037 0.125 0.065 0.215 0.023 0.021 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 321.84 0.044 0.102 0.109 0.317 0.048 0.044 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 312.56 0.043 0.088 0.152 0.406 0.086 0.073 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 445.95 0.061 0.076 0.213 0.482 0.156 0.120 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 812.09 0.111 0.081 0.324 0.563 0.213 0.225 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 404.40 0.055 0.133 0.379 0.696 0.322 0.289 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 609.37 0.083 0.067 0.462 0.764 0.487 0.392 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,281.75 0.175 0.085 0.637 0.848 0.589 0.607 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 414.27 0.057 0.104 0.694 0.952 0.767 0.674 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 814.89 0.111 0.020 0.805 0.972 0.972 0.805 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,422.78 0.195 0.028 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 7,315.02 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.668 3.257 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.411  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.9. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 
Equation (1’) and National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining the 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 204.45 0.027 0.103 0.027 0.103 0.006 0.007 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 245.19 0.033 0.143 0.060 0.246 0.025 0.022 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 299.68 0.040 0.117 0.101 0.363 0.052 0.045 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 314.13 0.042 0.085 0.143 0.448 0.091 0.075 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 454.15 0.061 0.074 0.204 0.522 0.164 0.122 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 815.46 0.110 0.078 0.314 0.600 0.222 0.226 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 414.40 0.056 0.121 0.369 0.721 0.329 0.289 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 642.95 0.086 0.061 0.456 0.782 0.496 0.391 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,328.73 0.179 0.077 0.634 0.859 0.594 0.606 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 424.84 0.057 0.096 0.692 0.955 0.766 0.673 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 825.19 0.111 0.018 0.802 0.974 0.974 0.802 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,469.16 0.198 0.026 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 7,438.31 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.719 3.259 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.459  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.10. Gini Coefficient Calculation Using Predicted National Earnings+ from 
Equation (1’) and National Age-Education Distribution, and Maintaining the 

















 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
15–24 years 
0–4 years of schooling 192.58 0.021 0.182 0.021 0.182 0.012 0.005 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 409.39 0.045 0.042 0.067 0.223 0.027 0.017 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 469.45 0.052 0.024 0.119 0.247 0.037 0.050 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 271.04 0.030 0.177 0.149 0.424 0.093 0.067 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 629.99 0.070 0.026 0.219 0.450 0.143 0.103 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 887.72 0.098 0.019 0.317 0.469 0.165 0.234 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 310.07 0.034 0.267 0.352 0.736 0.332 0.267 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 898.28 0.100 0.023 0.451 0.759 0.488 0.351 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,729.86 0.192 0.020 0.643 0.779 0.526 0.635 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 289.37 0.032 0.208 0.675 0.987 0.766 0.671 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 914.27 0.101 0.007 0.777 0.993 0.993 0.777 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 2,013.55 0.223 0.007 1.000 1.000 –– –– 
Total 9,015.57 1.0 1.0 –– –– 3.582 3.175 
   Gini Coefficient [sum(f)-sum(g)]= 0.407  
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation.
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.11 summarizes all Gini coefficients estimated above. These results 
indicate that the income inequality decreased from 1970 to 2000 among the 12 age-
education groups. If the age composition had remained the same from 1970 to 2000, the 
income inequality would have experienced a smaller decrease than the one observed 
when both age and education changed over time. In the case of education composition 
constant from 1970 to 2000, the income inequality would have decreased even more in 
the period. These numbers show that population aging had an important impact in the 
reduction of inequality in Brazil. Moreover, the improvement in education attainment 
avoided even further declines in income inequality in the country. Thus, public policies 
have to take into account that improvement in education attainment is necessary in order 
for workers to have better returns in earnings, but changes in the labor force age structure 
are also necessary to generate a more equal income distribution. Finally, family planning 
programs are essential in the reduction of inequality in Brazil, because they would 
decrease the proportion of younger workers entering the labor market in future years. 
 
Table 7.11. Summary of Gini Coefficients Using Predicted National Earnings from 
Equations (1) and (1’) and National Age-Education Distributions, 1970 and 
2000. 
Models Gini Coefficients Using National Distribution from: 




Own-effects 0.542 0.452 0.492 0.401 
Equation (1’): 
Own-effects X Year 0.547 0.411 0.459 0.407 
Source: 1970–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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An important aspect of the Brazilian economy that has to be taken into account 
for public policies is related to the differences in the male population distribution in age-
education groups by race. The 1970 Census does not have information on color or race 
characteristics of respondents. The 1980 Census has the variable “color” (cor) with 
categories “white” (branca), “black” (preta), “yellow” (amarela –– Asian), and “brown” 
(parda). The 1991 and 2000 Censuses added the category “indigenous” (indígena) to the 
ones available in the 1980 Census, and identify the variable as “color or race” (cor ou 
raça). Here this variable will be denominated as race. 
Wood and Carvalho (1994) and Carvalho et al (2003) indicated that the brown 
category had a growth over time above the expected vegetative growth. They suspect that 
because the black population experienced economic improvement through the years, and 
due to the stereotype of poverty associated to the black race, they might have identified 
themselves as brown. Moreover, the black identification seems to be increasing in recent 
years, perhaps due to the ideological work done by black civil equality movements in the 
1990s. Further, maybe due to the decline in the stereotype of being brown, people who 
identified themselves as white in the past are now classifying their race as brown. 
Because of the instability in the race classification over time, brown and black categories 
are usually aggregated in one single category. This aggregation is called “non-white” in 
this study. People classified as yellow or indigenous are not included in the following 
analysis, because they constitute a small proportion in the population. Among males 
between 15 and 64 years of age, only 0.69 percent were classified as yellow in 1980, 0.50 
in 1991 and 0.49 in 2000. The indigenous group varied from 0.18 percent in 1991 to 0.42 
percent in 2000, indicating that this group might also have problems with self-
identification. 
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Table 7.12 presents the male population distribution by age-education group and 
race from 1980 to 2000. Such as in Table 5.1, the proportion of males in the lowest 
education group (zero to four years of schooling) has been decreasing over time, and the 
proportion in the other groups have been increasing over time. Further, the distribution by 
race illustrates that there is a higher proportion of non-white population in the lowest 
education group, for all age groups, compared to the white population. Related to this 
pattern, the proportion of white population is bigger in the groups with five to eight years 
of schooling and at least nine years of schooling, compared to non-whites. 
Table 7.13 gives an idea about the mean real monthly earnings of the male 
population by age-education group and race from 1980 to 2000. Such as in Table 3.3, 
levels and patterns of mean earnings might be influenced by drastic variations among 
individuals, within each age-education group. However, even with this limitation, Table 
7.13 is a tool which provides an idea about earnings differences between non-whites and 
whites. In all age-education groups for all Censuses, earnings for white males are greater 
than the ones observed for black males. 
Analyzing Tables 7.12 and 7.13 in conjunction with the findings presented in this 
study, one might say that public policies would have to take into account that changes in 
the age-education composition has been occurring in different levels for non-whites 
compared to whites. Policies would then have to target groups that are experiencing 
slower fertility decline, slower improvements in educational attainment, as well as lower 
earnings –– the non-whites. Finally, as suggested by the differences across areas in the 
country, such policies should concentrate their effort on the non-whites living in areas 
with slower transitions in age-education structure. 
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Table 7.12. Percent of Male Population by Year, Race, and Age-Education Group, 1980–
2000. 
Age-education 
Group 1980 1991 2000 






0–4 years of schooling 26.87 15.98 19.93 9.77 12.99 5.60 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 9.07 11.68 11.82 12.44 13.74 11.41 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 3.00 7.93 3.96 7.77 7.47 12.62 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 18.96 14.55 15.16 9.93 11.36 6.64 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 3.20 4.42 6.32 7.35 7.80 7.53 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 2.33 6.49 4.66 9.86 5.89 10.02 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 21.06 17.54 19.02 15.43 15.68 11.36 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 1.63 2.93 3.06 4.22 6.21 7.22 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 1.08 4.08 2.96 7.76 5.15 11.22 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 12.07 11.48 11.67 11.33 10.80 9.99 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 0.47 1.28 0.78 1.50 1.60 2.32 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 0.26 1.63 0.67 2.62 1.32 4.06 
Total 13,969,010 18,294,096 20,551,988 22,446,044 24,182,946 28,176,560 
Source: 1980–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Table 7.13. Mean Real Monthly Earnings of Male Population by Year, Race, and Age-
Education Group, 1980–2000+. 
Age-education 
Group 1980 1991 2000 






0–4 years of schooling 282.94 360.77 194.17 253.82 201.80 265.01 
15–24 years 
5–8 years of schooling 392.69 464.48 297.25 370.56 268.65 334.36 
15–24 years 
9+ years of schooling 610.86 794.27 451.21 626.01 387.03 533.69 
25–34 years 
0–4 years of schooling 438.47 637.92 294.35 417.23 298.74 409.67 
25–34 years 
5–8 years of schooling 767.17 1,060.20 490.09 652.96 465.18 619.49 
25–34 years 
9+ years of schooling 1,320.87 2,165.86 863.60 1,390.95 779.24 1,327.54 
35–49 years 
0–4 years of schooling 487.97 826.58 368.88 587.85 376.62 570.53 
35–49 years 
5–8 years of schooling 1,061.73 1,654.57 712.56 1,034.82 621.95 889.83 
35–49 years 
9+ years of schooling 2,059.90 3,535.43 1,442.33 2,409.82 1,311.60 2,328.44 
50–64 years 
0–4 years of schooling 440.25 804.08 330.03 581.17 380.09 649.22 
50–64 years 
5–8 years of schooling 1,134.47 1,911.23 778.03 1,288.33 698.79 1,232.89 
50–64 years 
9+ years of schooling 2,301.26 3,935.86 1,846.48 3,037.60 1,717.11 3,325.95 
Total 490.89 1,023.34 418.37 873.96 484.31 1,025.90 
+ Nominal income was converted to base 1 in January 2002, taking into account changes in currency and inflation. 
Source: 1980–2000 Brazilian Censuses. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
In this study an old question has been tackled, but in a different context and with a 
different way of extracting lessons from the data. Interesting and important results 
concerning the effects of shifts in the age distribution of the working age population have 
been obtained by a number of authors by looking at this question within the context of the 
baby-boom generation’s impact on the earnings of different cohorts in the United States. 
But the question has received little attention in the context of the countries of Asia and 
Latin America, which are now experiencing substantial shifts in their age distributions 
due to large and rapid declines in fertility. In these countries, the shifts in the age 
distribution have also been accompanied by dramatic increases in educational attainment 
that one might expect would also alter earnings distributions. A major difference between 
the United States and Latin American countries, such as Brazil, is in the magnitude of 
regional differences in the timing of both the educational and demographic transitions. 
These changes were fairly homogeneous across United States, but have had enormous 
variation geographically in Brazil. This heterogeneity both motivates and enhances the 
value of the regional approach to the problem that was undertaken in this study. 
The first and most important result here is that relative group size matters. The 
own-quantity wage effects are generally negative, as predicted by factor-demand theory; 
and potential biases induced by a number of effects for which adjustments could not be 
made mean that, if anything, the true impacts of changing relative quantities are even 
larger in absolute value than the estimates suggested here. The results imply that workers 
classified by age-education group are not perfect substitutes, so that own cohort-
education size generally depresses earnings. That the effects increase with education is 
consistent with the observation (Hamermesh 1993, chapter 3) of lower own-wage 
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elasticities as education increases. Also, while there may have been shifts in relative 
demand over the 30-year time span that was examined, unlike in the United States, they 
do not appear to have been large enough to offset the effects of variations in relative 
supply. 
The effects of biased technological change and/or institutional changes are 
suggested by the evidence generated by the models that allowed the technological 
parameters to change over time. Most of the parameters became less negative over time, 
suggesting that more recent changes in relative supply have altered relative wages less 
than would have been the case in the 1970s. Indeed, the own-quantity effect for the least-
skilled group –– workers with 0–4 years of schooling –– is essentially zero, suggesting 
that the increasing relative scarcity of such workers is no longer contributing to an 
increase in the relative earnings of the (fewer) remaining workers in the group. The 
results also suggest that throughout the period the sharp changes in the relative supply of 
the most skilled workers have reduced relative wages in this group: Accounting for 
relative shifts in supply, implies that wage inequality may have risen less than if these 
substitution effects had not occurred. 
With respect to the central issue of the demographic dividend in developing 
economies, it was clarified from the outset that a related but different question is 
addressed in this study. The main focus in the dividend literature has been on changes in 
the dependency ratio. In countries such as Brazil, this ratio is undergoing dramatic 
change and will continue to do so for several decades. It is also true, however, that in 
terms of both age and educational attainment the composition of the Brazilian labor force, 
and labor forces in developing countries generally, is undergoing dramatic shifts. What 
has been investigated here, is whether these compositional shifts have had effects beyond 
those that are normally analyzed in the dividend literature using Mincerian earnings 
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equations, and whether studying their role in the context of a formal theory of labor 
demand is worthwhile. Results suggest that shifts in the demographic and skill structure 
of the labor force are indeed influential and that this approach represents a fruitful way of 
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